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1. Preface 
 
1.1. Introduction 
‘Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also 
reinforce each other.’ (Annan, 2005: 5) 
The connection between security policy and development policy may not be obvious 
at first, especially for people without previous knowledge about the topic. 
When thinking of security policy, soldiers with uniforms, military equipment and 
armed conflict will be among the first things which will come to one´s mind while 
development policy is seen very differently. Providing aid in so called 
underdeveloped countries, building schools and helping others to help themselves 
are among the associations towards development policy. To narrow down these two 
fields to only these views can be called antiquated however as nowadays soldiers 
carry out tasks, which fall under development policy and development workers help 
with ‘Security Sector Reforms’ and disarmament of fighters, which range deep into 
the security policy field. 
 
1.2. My motivation for working on this topic 
 
I picked this topic because of two reasons. First of all I am sure that the topic of the 
security-development nexus will stay important over the next decades as conflicts, 
especially in development countries1, will most likely not vanish. Resources like oil, 
water, diamonds and metals get scarcer and more important every day. With fighting 
for influence over those resources, conflicts will be one of the most important means 
to secure or widen this influence. For this scenario a working coordination and 
cooperation between security policy and development policy is very important 
                                                 
1 The term development countries is seen critical nowadays as it is judgemental and implies the 
superiority of the developed countries. I will still use the term in my paper as no universally 
acknowledged term exists instead of it which is non-judgemental. 
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because on its own both each policy area will most likely fail to carry out 
peacebuilding operations to tackle these conflicts.  
The second reason is my personal interest in the status quo of the coordination and 
coherence respectively between these two policy fields within the European Union. 
There is a vast pool of information and publications about the security policy of the 
European Union (EU) and there is also much material on the development policy of 
the Union. However if one searches for publications on the contemporary, as well as 
past connection of these policy fields, the amount of sources is low. As I was very 
interested in learning more I decided to devote my thesis to this topic. 
While for the past decades the European Union was already a global player in the 
area of development cooperation2 it was not, until recently, taken seriously as a 
global power regarding crisis prevention and peacebuilding. The war on the Balkans 
and in Kosovo in the 1990s demonstrated the EU and the world that the Union did 
not have the instruments or the resources to conduct joint missions which can handle 
such conflicts. This powerlessness led to the creation of capabilities within the EU, 
primarily the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and to important papers 
like the European Security Strategy (ESS). 
With these new instruments the EU has been carrying out civil-military operations for 
the last decade. Up to this day 23 missions were led by the EU itself, including six 
EUFOR (European Union Force) missions. The latest of these, Operation Atalanta on 
the Horn of Africa, is still running until this day.3 
Recently the Treaty of Lisbon led to some fundamental changes within the Union 
which also influenced the security as well as the development policy. The most 
obvious examples are the abolishment of the pillar structure as well as the recreation 
of the post of the High Representative (HR). 
The development policy is one of the most important allies for the security policy as 
today´s conflicts and wars are difficult to win by military force alone. Proper 
                                                 
2 The European Union is the biggest single donor of development aid worldwide. Its member countries 
also provide a big part of the global aid. 
3 For more information about the mission I would like to refer you to (Leitner, 2009) 
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development policy is a key aspect in achieving sustainable peace as it should lead 
to social and economic gains for society.  
On paper these two policy areas are getting more and more interconnected 
especially through newly established institutions, mechanisms and the coherence 
imperative. A productive connection of these two areas can give missions an 
impartiality boost and thus makes them more valid. It is often noted that development 
and security are contingent upon each other and aim for the same goal, which is a 
prosperous and peaceful civil society. 
For nearly a decade the EU is now able to conduct civil-military operations abroad 
without being dependent on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the 
United Nations (UN), which gives the Union a more powerful voice in the world. It is 
to be expected that the EU will continue to launch further missions abroad therefore it 
is important to look into the past, learn from it and adopt the lessons learned for 
missions to come. 
 
1.3. Research Question 
 
If one looks at birth of the development and security policy within the EU it is 
apparent that both areas experienced major changes during the last few decades, 
while always having some sort of connection with each other. Sometimes the 
connection was very tight and sometimes it was loose but it was always there. In my 
thesis I want to make this connection between the two policy areas visible, also by 
showing how the areas individually developed over the last decades. 
My research question is: 
Is there an interweavement between the policy fields of security and development in 
the European Union? How can a possible interweavement be seen within the 
Union´s institutions and in foreign missions of the European Union, for example 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA? 
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The aim of this paper is therefore to impart on how this connection can be rated and 
how it developed into the status quo. I will also point out potentials and problems and 
how they affect missions abroad. These tasks will undergo critical assessment. 
To achieve this goal I will elaborate on the EU Treaties, publications, important terms, 
mechanisms and institutions. 
 
1.4. Methods 
 
The following paper examines the interweavement of development and security 
policy and should be of relevance for development and security studies as well as 
political science. Methodologically I used a mix of primary sources (especially EU and 
OECD documents among others), secondary resources (magazine articles, volumes 
and monographs) as well as trustworthy internet resources. They all were carefully 
picked. Most of my sources treated either security policy or development policy on its 
own. Especially sources dealing with the history of the EU security policy were 
extensively available while literature, which deals with the connection between 
security and development, was scarce, which indicates that not much research has 
been done regarding this topic.  
 
1.5. Structure of the Paper 
 
This chapter provided a short introduction, motives, research questions and methods 
to introduce the reader to the topic of this paper. 
The second chapter deals with definitions, which prove to be important as the defined 
terms do not have universal meanings. Therefore it is essential to agree on 
definitions to prevent misunderstandings.  
The third chapter describes the beginning of the EU development policy until the 
Treaty of Maastricht, which introduced the pillar system in the EU. From there on the 
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chapter elaborates on the latest treaties to point out changes, which happened 
because of a new treaty or just during the time of it being in force. This chapter also 
includes the contracts between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States (ACP), which are the most important development cooperation partners of 
the Union. 
The fourth chapter deals with the EU security policy from the late 1940s until the 
Treaty of Maastricht and then proceeds in the same fashion as the previous chapter 
with descriptions of the changes the security policy was undergoing during the Treaty 
of Maastricht to Lisbon. 
The fifth chapter brings security and development together and analyses how the 
connection between these two can be seen with reference to the two preceding 
chapters. It also elaborates on the coherence term in connection with development 
and security policy and how these two policies see each other. This chapter also 
introduces mechanisms, institutions and changes in treaties, which are important in 
understanding the security-development nexus.  
Chapter 6 deals with reasons for conflict, rules of intervention and how the EU 
prepares and carries out civil-military operations. A small insight is given into two 
concluded EU missions, Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo. 
Chapter 7 elaborates on the case study of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the most recent 
concluded EU civil-military operation. Before the mission itself is described, important 
background information about Chad is given. The preparation of EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
and the mission itself is then described as well as how the civil-military coordination 
worked out. The last few pages point out the achievements and the failures of the 
mission and which point to lessons which should be learned. 
The 8th and last chapter concludes the paper and answers the initial scientific 
question about the connection and coordination between the development and the 
security policy. 
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2. Definitions 
 
2.1. Important Definitions regarding Development 
 
2.1.1. Development 
 
The political development term includes quite a few points, which are commonly 
agreed on by all definitions. Development should lead to eradicating the worst misery 
and making basic needs available to all people. There is also consensus that 
development should be more than just survival, by including additional factors like 
protection from disease, shelter and basic security to the term. (Fischer, Hödl and 
Parnreiter, 2004: 13) 
One could say that development describes the desired social and economic 
progress. This definition, published in the Brandt-Report of 1980, makes 
development a never ending process as there will be ever changing and different 
perceptions of what is desirable. (Independent Commission on International 
Development Issues, 1980) With the introduction of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs)4 guidance on how to achieve development was introduced. The 
European Union adopted these eight MDGs to make development available to all. 
The EU gives further insight on their view on development in ‘The European 
Consensus on Development’ from 2006. This document points out that the 
eradication of poverty through sustainable development is the primary goal the Union 
wants to achieve via development policy. Sustainable development means that it 
should be carried out in a way which does not negatively affect the future 
generations. (European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006: Part 1) 
                                                 
4 The 8 MDGs seek to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, to achieve universal primary education, 
to promote gender equality and empower women, to reduce the mortality rate of child, to improve 
maternal health, to fight diseases, especially HIV/AIDS and malaria, to ensure environmental 
sustainability and to develop a global partnership for development. (http://www.endpoverty2015.org/) 
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While it is important to know that development is, it is even more important to provide 
development through development policy. 
 
2.1.2. Development Policy 
 
Dieter Nohlen states in his ‘Lexikon Dritte Welt’ that development policy is the sum of 
all resources used and actions taken by developing countries as well as by 
developed countries to promote the economic and social development of developing 
countries. The goal of development policy is therefore to improve the standard of 
living for people affected by these measures. (Nohlen, 2000: 224) The term is seen 
as a very broad field which should not be a one-way process but a lively cooperation 
between various actors. (Nuscheler, 2004: 76) 
The EU development policy is a joint competence of the Union and the member 
states and was to be found in pillar I prior to the Treaty of Lisbon. Development policy 
of the member states and the European Union should be complementary and 
coherent to reinforce each other. (European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006: 
The Development Challenge)  
Countries which profit the most of the European development policy are the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), which consist of 48 countries at the moment.5 Europe´s 
development policy also works together with countries, which fall under the Middle 
Income Countries (MICs) term. 
As already stated the development policy is not a one-way street and therefore 
should not only benefit the MICs and LDCs but also the EU member countries as 
‘[...] it will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world, 
reflecting the interdependency of its richer and poorer countries. This indicates that 
                                                 
5 The European Union does not have its own list of LDCs but follows the UN Resolution of 1971 
(Resolution 2186 XXXVI). 33 of these LDCs are in Africa, 14 in Asia and 1 in Latin America. For an 
updated list of the LDC by the United Nations see http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/. 
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our security is only possible if development achievements pay off for the developing 
countries.’ (European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006: 1) 
Europe´s development policy is based on Art. 177 of the EC treaty from 1957 in 
which it states that it should lead to economic and social integration of the developing 
countries into the world economy which should help to reduce the gap of wealth. 
Paragraph 2 of Art. 177 continues by stating that democracy, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are aims of the development policy strategy of the Union 
(Neisser and Verschraegen, 2001: 110f) 
Not all funds and goods given to development countries is development aid. This is 
an important mechanism which should prevent the ‘watering down’ of development. 
 
2.1.3. Official Development Aid 
 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) is responsible for important definitions 
regarding development policy and aid distribution for OECD member countries6. It 
publishes regular Peer-Reviews, which check the member states for complying with 
the rules in the development area. The published development aid numbers are 
highly connected with the DAC definitions catalogue and therefore of utter 
importance. One of the most important definitions is the Official Development 
Assistance (ODA). It 
‘[...] is defined as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA 
Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are: 
i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their 
executive agencies; and 
 
 
                                                 
6 All EU member countries are also members of the OECD. 
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ii. each transaction of which: 
a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as its main objective; and 
b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent)’ 
(Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, 2010: 11) 
In contrast to the ODA stand the Other Official Flows (OOF), which define expenses 
that are not allowed to be declared as ODA. These are for example funds forwarded 
for commercial or export facilitating purposes as well as transactions with a grant 
element of less than 25 per cent. (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, 
2010: 11) 
In general security expenditure is excluded from counting as ODA. Over the years 
some expenses, which are related to security issues, were included in being allowed 
to be seen as ODA though. These are 
‘[...] additional costs incurred for the use of military personnel to deliver humanitarian 
aid or perform development services.’ (Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD, 2010: 12) 
Tasks which are nowadays included in counting as ODA are: 
- Police training for civil policing, 
- Security Sector Reform7, 
- Peacebuilding, 
- Conflict prevention and resolution (which includes capacity building, 
monitoring, dialogue and information exchange) 
 
 
                                                 
7 For more on what a Security Sector Reform is and does I would like to refer to OECD DAC, 2007 
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Explicitly excluded are: 
- The means to combat terrorism 
- Military strategy and defence cooperation efforts (Development Assistance 
Committee of the OECD, 2010: 14) 
Participation in peacebuilding operations is also partly applicable as ODA if the UN 
Security Council authorises the mission. Then the following tasks fall also under the 
ODA term: 
- ‘Human rights and election monitoring 
- Reintegration of demobilised soldiers 
- Rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure 
- Monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and police forces 
- Security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities 
- Training in customs and border control procedures 
- Advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilisation policy 
- Repatriation and demobilisation of armed factions, and disposal of their 
weapons 
- Explosive mine removal.’ (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, 
2010: 14) 
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2.2. Important Definitions regarding Security 
 
2.2.1. Security 
 
The meaning of the term security changed a lot over the last decades and is currently 
fundamentally different from the meaning it used to have. Before the Second World 
War the term was very state centric. Waging wars was not considered illegal during 
the time of the League of Nations (LON) and security policy focused on threats by 
large governmental controlled armies. After the end of the Second World War the 
establishment of the UN changed a lot as waging wars was no longer considered 
legal.8 Until the end of the Cold War, and also beyond in many areas of the world, the 
security term was still closely related to the nation states. After the collapse of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) a paradigm shift of the security term 
could be observed. The constant threat of war breaking loose between the two 
superpowers vanished and security policy began to shift towards new focuses with 
Global Security and Human Security being the most important. (Glasius and Kaldor, 
2005: 64)  
The concept of security only focusing on the stability on the nation state is therefore 
out-dated nowadays as ‘traditional wars’ between countries, where governmental 
controlled armies fight each other, are on the decline. After the Cold War the threats 
of insecurity linked more to sources inside a country. The focus shifted from 
defending national territory against an invading army to different threats like terrorism 
and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.  
The scale of security also shifted from protecting Achieving security got much more 
difficult with the updated definition of the term as internal security is strongly 
connected with external security. Examples to illustrate this connection are conflict 
spill overs or terrorist attacks. (Glasius and Kaldor, 2005: 62)  
                                                 
8 The League of Nations existed from 1919 to 1946 but was abandoned after the Second World War 
as this institution was seen as not capable of preventing wars. The charter establishing the United 
Nations was signed in June 1945 and succeeded the League of Nations. 
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The updated security term also pushed the topic of state fragility. 
 
2.2.2. State Fragility 
 
This term is associated with a lot of negative consequences, not only for the citizens 
of a country, but also for the international community. (Iqbal and Starr, 2008: 315)  
The concept of fragile states is very complex with many existing definitions and 
methods to determine the fragility or non-fragility. One of the most common 
definitions is the one published by the OECD: 
‘[...] a fragile state [...] [is] unable to meet its population’s expectations or manage 
changes in expectations and capacity through the political process. Whether and to 
what degree these expectations entail poverty reduction, development, security or 
human rights will depend on historical, cultural and other factors that shape state-
society relations in specific contexts. Questions of legitimacy, in embedded or 
historical forms, will influence these expectations, while performance against 
expectations and the quality of participation/the political process will also produce (or 
reduce) legitimacy.’ (OECD, 2008: 16) 
There are also other definitions, which are often used like the one by the Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy of the Carleton University (CIFP, 2008) or by the 
Department for International Development in the United Kingdom (UK). (Department 
for International Development, 2005: 7f) What most of the definitions have in 
common is that they care about three central attributes: effectiveness, authority and 
legitimacy.  
The measurement of these attributes is difficult to achieve as there are many 
variables, which have to be observed: Literacy of the population can hint on the 
country´s effectiveness and criminal rates can tell something about the authority the 
state while the (non)existence of fair and regular elections can give some insight on 
the legitimacy of a government. (Mata and Ziaja, 2009: 6) 
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The danger of fragile states is that they are seen as able to infect bordering 
countries, especially when they are already vulnerable. (O'Loughlin and Witmer, 
2005: 3) They are described as an international risk because they can act as safe 
havens for actors linked to organised crime, drugs production or terrorism. Fragile 
states are also not desirable for the development community as fragility can get in the 
way of fulfilling, at least certain aspects, of the MDGs. (Jenne, 2009: 2f) It is also 
seen that states marked as being fragile are falling behind in economic terms 
compared with other, non-fragile, countries over time. (World Bank, 2009) 
State fragility is often accompanied, preceded or succeeded by some sort of conflict. 
 
2.2.3. Conflict 
 
One of the most used definitions for conflict nowadays is the one provided by the 
Uppsala Conflict Date Program (UCDP), which published: 
‘Armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is 
the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.’ (Department of 
Peace and Conflict Research, ) 
This definition raises the issue of the intensity of conflicts. If a conflict is of low, 
medium or high intensity mostly depends on deaths caused by the conflict. For the 
UCDP a conflict with at least 25 and a maximum of 1.000 battle deaths a year is 
considered to be a minor conflict. From 1.000 deaths on the conditions of a war are 
fulfilled. (Mata and Ziaja, 2009: 7) 
Contemporary conflicts have shifted towards a bigger involvement of civilians over 
the last decades. In many conflicts they are being used as resources of labour and 
assets for conflict parties. Furthermore civilians and combatants are often very hard 
to distinguish.  
It is not new however, that civilians are involved in conflicts. If one looks at the 
guerrilla and liberation wars of the last centuries, especially between the 1950s and 
The Security-Development Nexus in the European Union 
18 
1980s, it is indisputable that civilians were always involved in conflicts. What has 
definitely changed though is that war, conflict and violence are seen as an important 
source of income for certain people, especially for warlords. (Leader and Macrae, 
2000: 14)  
Other changes are seen within the ‘New Wars’ term, advocated by Mary Kaldor and 
Herfried Münckler. The ‘New Wars’ see a decline in conflicts between states to 
conflicts within states, changing motives for starting conflicts and different funding 
methods for starting and prolonging conflicts.9 (Collier, 2000) 
One of the negative consequences of conflict is that it can lead to more violent acts in 
the future. It is more likely that a conflict breaks out in areas where shortly before 
another conflict has already taken place. This can lead to a vicious circle of violence, 
which most of the time hits fragile states.  
Within the security-development nexus there are some terms which point to a strong 
interweavement between these two. I want to elaborate on the most important ones. 
 
2.3. Important Definitions regarding both policy fields 
 
2.3.1. Coherence 
 
A widely recognised definition of coherence comes from the Dutch scholar Paul 
Hoebink. He sees coherence as 
‘[...] the non-occurrence of effects of policy that are contrary to the intended results or 
aims of policy.’ (Hoebink, 2005: 37) 
                                                 
9 The motives of war are said to have changed from geopolitical issues to ethnic conflicts in which 
civilians are disproportionally involved. A shift away from fighting enemy combatants to gain control 
over civilians, infrastructure and livelihood systems is the consequence. The funding also changed 
with international crime being the main source of money needed for waging the conflict. (Glasius and 
Kaldor, 2005: 65) For more info on the term I refer to Münckler´s ‘The New Wars’ from 2004. 
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For him the word coherence does not describe an ideal state of interweaving politics 
but the missing of incoherence, as he sees this as the natural state. 
Guido Ashoff on the other hands sees coherence in a positive way as he defines it as 
the cooperation of different policies towards a superior goal. (Ashoff, 2005: 11ff) 
It is important to know that perfect coherence is not the goal neither is it achievable in 
real politics. The reason is that in complex institutions like the European Union it is 
simply not possible that all policy areas are perfectly coherent with each other. A 
decision can lead to a boost in coherence between two policy areas while at the 
same time it promotes incoherence in another political field. Politics is always a 
process without a clear end. Therefore incoherence is unavoidable in pluralist 
systems like the EU. 
Incoherence can be intended at the expenses of other political fields, especially when 
higher goals are of concern.10 This is rather the exception than the rule however, as 
most incoherence is unintended. (Hoebink, 2004: 193ff) 
Even if it was possible, the existence of perfect coherence would not always be 
associated with advantages. It can have negative impacts as well. If two political 
areas, for example development policy and security policy, work together in a field 
where both of them have opposing opinions, coherence can mean that they decide 
on the least common denominator, which could be not sufficient to provide a 
comprehensive solution for a special problem. This can lead to so called negative 
coordination. Especially since development cooperation is not one of the most 
powerful policy areas within the European Union a positive coherence approach is 
very important for reaching the future goals of development, in particular the MDGs. 
(Kevenhöster, 2002: 185f) 
Due to Hoebink three types of coherence or incoherence exist. While internal 
coherence measures the coherence within a policy field, the expanded internal 
coherence aims at coherence and coordination between two policy fields. External 
                                                 
10 The higher goals for one policy area must not be coherent with the higher goals of another area.  
While the higher goals of development policy are geared towards the reduction of poverty, the higher 
goals of the trade policy can lead to negative consequences for development.  
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coherence on the other hand tries to make coherence work between one policy field 
and many other fields, which concern it for various reasons. (Obrovsky, 2007: 6)  
For my paper only the expanded internal coherence is relevant as I want to elaborate 
on coherence between security and development policy. 
Coherency between development and security is especially important due to the 
changing development and security terms which see Human Security as an important 
issue. 
 
2.3.2. Human Security 
 
Even if the term was introduced in the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) in 1994 it took several years before it was reflected in real politics. (United 
Nations Development Programme, 1994) 
In 2003 a report was released, which was very influential and important for the term. 
‘Human Security Now’ by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen of the Commission on 
Human Security tried to steer the focus away from classic security and development 
patterns towards Human Security, a very elusive term. 
The Commission on Human Security uses the following definition: 
‘The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from 
critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment.’ 
(quoted from Alkire, 2002: 1) 
In the report Amartya Sen conceptualised human security in another way as he 
focused on the insecurities that affect people and which must be removed. He 
defines the term like this: 
‘Human security as an idea fruitfully supplements the expansionist perspective of 
human development by directly paying attention to what are sometimes called  
‘downside risks’. The insecurities [...] demand that special attention be paid to the 
dangers of sudden deprivation. Human security demands protection from these 
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dangers and the empowerment of people so that they can cope with — and when 
possible overcome — these hazards.’ (Ogata and Sen, 2003: 8) 
Regarding development, the report moved the focus away from economic growth, 
which was the main goal of development policy until the 1990s, to improving the 
quality of human life, which is much more complex but a better indicator than solely 
economic numbers. (Robinson, 2006: 73)  
Human security can be understood from a narrow or broad point of view. Followers of 
a narrow understanding concentrate on threats of violence, like civil war, while 
individuals favouring the broad conception also include risks like natural disasters, 
famine, environmental pollution, poverty, displacements and social exclusion to the 
threats.11 (Duffield, 2006: 12)  
 
2.3.3. Good Governance 
 
Good governance is one of the key principles for the European Union for granting 
development aid nowadays. The EU sees good governance as 
‘[...] the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and 
financial resources for the purpose of equitable and sustainable development.’ 
(European Commission, 2000: Art. 9.3) 
It is an instrument to get governments to improve framework conditions for poverty 
reduction but also a goal in its own right. (Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Department for Development Cooperation and Cooperation with Eastern Europe; 
Austrian Development Agency, 2006: 5) 
The United Nations assigned eight major characteristics to identify good governance. 
This type of government has to be participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, 
transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and follows the rule of law. 
                                                 
11 For more information see also Klingebiel, 2006: 2f 
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(United Nations ESCAP, 
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp) 
An important factor of a good government is that it has output and input legitimacy. 
Output legitimacy is realised if the government takes decisions, which are in the 
interest of its citizens, while input legitimacy is achieved when the government picks 
up its citizen´s demands and transform them into political decisions to support these 
wishes. If a government can deal with its people in this way it is seen as legitimate. 
(Börzel, Pamuk and Stahn, 2008: 6ff) 
 
2.3.4. Peacebuilding 
 
1975 can be seen as the hour of birth for the term as Johan Galtung´s influential 
article named ‘three approaches to Peace’ was released. (Galtung, 1975) The big 
breakthrough for the term came nearly twenty years later however as former UN 
General Secretary Boutros-Ghali pushed the topic by releasing an ‘Agenda for 
Peace’ and an ‘Agenda for Development’. The term was included, yet not reflected, in 
politics immediately. The Brahimi Report brought the term in the spotlight and led to 
the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2006. The concept is widely 
used in the security-development nexus and Richmond (Richmond, 2004: 132) noted 
that a peacebuilding consensus existed. (Bueger and Vennesson, 2009: 11) 
Within the peacebuilding discussion there are two different views on how it should be 
defined, the broad and the narrow view. 
The narrow version has many advocates, for example the former UN General 
Secretary Boutros-Ghali. He defined peacebuilding in his ‘Agenda for Peace’ paper 
as  
‘[...] action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify 
peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict.’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: II. 21) 
Due to this concept peacebuilding is implemented in a framework consisting of 
peacemaking, which is understood as diplomatic activities, peacekeeping, which 
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deals with all military activities, and peacebuilding. In this context peacebuilding got 
the role of guiding the way to democracy in the aftermath of a military conflict. The 
Brahimi Report got more concrete and pointed out the connection between military 
and civilian aspects. Peacebuilding 
‘[...] defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the 
foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations 
something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building includes 
but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, 
strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local 
police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the 
monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing 
technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and 
support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation 
techniques.’ (Brahimi, 2000: 3) 
The broad version of peacebuilding sees it less as a connection between civilian and 
military areas but more as an integrated concept, which includes various kinds of 
policies that should lead to preventing the outbreak of violence after a conflict 
officially ended. (Bueger and Vennesson, 2009: 14f) 
To sum up, the narrow version prioritises the security aspect and leaves out areas, 
which will have an effect in the future12 and therefore focuses on immediate impacts. 
The broad version of peacebuilding on the other hand focuses on tackling root 
causes of conflict by means which range far into the future. This has the negative 
effect that most of these ventures will not have much effect initially however. 
  
                                                 
12 Examples are infrastructure, health care or education which are all future oriented. 
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3. Development Policy of the EU 
 
3.1. 1950 to Maastricht 
 
The discussion about a European development policy started in the 1950s in a time 
when the reconstruction of a big part of Europe was not yet completed. Jean-Baptiste 
Nicolas Robert Schuman, former Prime Minister of France, told in his famous ‘A 
United States of Europe’ speech on 9 May 1950 that  
‘Europe, with new means at her disposal, will be able to pursue the realisation of one 
of her essential tasks: the development of the African Continent.’ (Schuman, 1982: 
47f) 
This speech took place years before the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC)13 Treaties were signed and 
already showed the will of France to include their associated territories in Africa into 
the Union. While they were not included in the 1952 ECSC Treaty, a similar approach 
found its way into the Treaty of Rome.14 (Bartels, 2007: 716) 
The goals of this association in the Treaty of Rome were described as followed: 
‘The Member States agree to associate with the Community the non-European 
countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and 
the Netherlands. [...] The purpose of association shall be to promote the economic 
and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close 
economic relations between them and the Community as a whole. [...] [The] 
association shall serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of the 
inhabitants of these countries and territories in order to lead them to the economic, 
                                                 
13 The EEC is also called the Treaty of Rome. 
14 Even today the former associated countries enjoy better access and aid through the European 
Union than countries, which were never colonised by Europeans. It must be noted though that over 
the years, thanks to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the European Union, these disparities 
became smaller. (Bartels, 2007: 716) 
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social and cultural development to which they aspire.’ (European Coal and Steel 
Community, 1957: Part IV, Article 131) 
This part of the treaty manifested the idea of free trade for both sides, as well as a 
possibility for the associated countries to get investments and development aid easier 
than before. (Bartels, 2007: 717ff) As most colonial powers of Europe were part of 
the EEC it was inevitable to work together with developing countries.15 Especially in 
Africa many associated countries were located, most of them colonised by France. 
The Treaty of Rome was therefore the first treaty to include paragraphs which could 
be linked to development policy. It created ‘the Association of the Overseas 
Countries and Territories’ which can be found in Part IV, Art. 131 to 135. By today´s 
standards this is of course an out-dated version of development policy, as the 
colonies had no saying in this cooperation. The aim of Art. 131 was to reduce tariffs, 
which should be abandoned within the whole territory of the EEC and the Oversees 
Countries and Territories (OCT) later on, and to give aid to the countries concerned. 
These two elements, market access and economic assistance and aid, are still one of 
the main instruments nowadays in the European development cooperation. 
In the first step only current and former colonies respectively were able to receive aid 
and to be part of the OCT. Resistance came from member countries without colonies 
which led to the introduction of the European Development Fund (EDF) which was 
put outside of the regular EU budget. From the beginning the development policy of 
the European Union was not introduced to make the member states´ programmes 
obsolete but to carry out development policy in a way that these two areas, the joint 
EU policy and the member state policy, should reinforce each other. (Broberg, 2011: 
2) 
During and after the de-colonisation the now independent countries wanted to 
maintain the special relations with their former motherlands. This led to many treaties 
which sustained the preferential trade and aid access for the now independent 
countries, most prominently the EU-ACP Treaties which are described later in this 
chapter. (Hoebink, 2004: 26f) 
 
                                                 
15 The exceptions were the United Kingdom and Denmark with the latter having no colonies in Africa. 
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3.2. The Time of Maastricht 
 
Development policy has been part of the European Union since the Treaty of Rome 
but played a minimal role until the 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU)16. The first 
attempt to start a strong development policy was during the discussions prior to the 
ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. The Netherlands tried to 
implement a paragraph about development cooperation into the act, but failed at first. 
During the Presidency of Luxembourg in 1992, which supported the Dutch intention, 
The Netherlands were able to deliver the proposal and achieved the inclusion. The 
result was included as Art. 130u to 130y of Title XVII after only two rounds of 
discussions. This showed that development policy was not an important topic for the 
majority of the member countries as most of them did not care if these paragraphs 
were included or not. Nevertheless over time these articles grew more important as 
member states and European Union institutions made use of them.  
The official objectives of development policy during that time were sustainable 
economic and social development, a smooth integration into the world economy and 
the reduction of poverty as well as political goals like the rule of law, promotion of 
democracy and the compliance with human rights. (Hoebink, 2004: 2ff) The so called 
‘three C´s’ also grew important during that time. They stated that the EU development 
policy should be complementary, coordinated and coherent.17  
 
3.3. The Time of Amsterdam 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam did not include changes for the development cooperation 
besides putting the agenda of migration and asylum policies from pillar 3 to pillar 1, 
the home pillar of development policy. (Hartmann, 2009: 16) Until 2002 an own 
                                                 
16 The TEU is also known as the Treaty of Maastricht. 
17 More information, descriptions and relevant publications can be found on the website www.three-
cs.net 
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Development Council existed which was responsible for the development 
cooperation of the Union. It was abolished that year and integrated into the General 
Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC) which led to a transfer of responsibility 
from development experts to foreign ministers. These had to deal with CFSP and 
development issues now. (Hartmann, 2009: 10) This was seen negatively in the 
development community as a downgrading in importance and quality was feared. 
 
3.4. The Time of Nice 
 
While the Treaty of Nice itself did not change anything regarding development 
cooperation, the European Union was working hard in this policy field. In 2005 the 
Commission, the Parliament and the member states agreed on the ‘European 
Consensus on Development’. This consensus provided a conceptual framework for 
development cooperation for the Union and the member states. It emphasised that 
development cooperation has to be about partnership and equality, which was not 
always the case in the past. The framework also says that 
‘[...] development is a central goal by itself; and that sustainable development 
includes good governance, human rights and political, economic, social and 
environmental aspects’. (European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006)  
This paper can be seen as the ‘ESS of the development policy’ as it is very blurry and 
more internally important than externally. It is a guideline on how the European Union 
wants to achieve their development policy but without any consequences for failure. 
 
3.5. The Time of Lisbon 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, in short Lisbon Treaty, entered into force on 1 
December 2009 and brought some changes for the development policy. In terms of 
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competence of the European Union over development matters the treaty does not 
modify anything though. Article 4 point 4 says that 
‘In the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have 
competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy; however, the 
exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from 
exercising theirs.’ (European Commission, 2010a: Article 4, 4) 
That means that the Union and the member states can legislate side by side over 
same matters of development cooperation like it used to be in former treaties. About 
the objective of the joint development policy the Lisbon Treaty emphasises in Article 
208 point 1 that  
‘Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the 
reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty.’ 
This goal was also known from former treaties. 
Still, at first sight it looked as development cooperation was abandoned for the most 
part in the new treaty as the TEU offered a much broader view on the objectives of 
development cooperation in Article 177. In fact, development is now to be found, 
except for Article 208, in Part 5 of the Lisbon Treaty, the External Action by the 
Union.  
Hence development cooperation within the Lisbon Treaty was not abandoned for the 
most part. Instead it was given the same, if not more, importance under the aegis of 
the foreign policy. (Broberg, 2011: 6)  
In terms of coherence the institutional reform of the Treaty of Lisbon could change 
something for the better as the incoherent pillar structure was abandoned which was 
seen as the main reason consistency and coherence was difficult to achieve.  
When fading out the institutional changes in Lisbon, nothing substantial has changed 
in the new treaty. Article 208 (1) does not introduce anything new as  
‘[...] the Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the 
policies that it implements which are likely to affect development countries.’ 
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Over the last two decades European Values got a prominent place in the EC treaty 
and within the development policy. The Lisbon Treaty further engages the European 
Union to promote its values in the world according to Art. 21(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union: 
‘The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law.’ 
To sum up, Lisbon induced changes in the institutional structure which affect the 
development policy while major changes in the political field itself were avoided. Due 
to Broberg only two changes may effect development cooperation noticeable in the 
new treaty: Further value promotion as well as the strengthening of coherence. Both 
of these are important for the Union´s foreign missions. (Broberg, 2011: 12f) 
Regarding the new treaty, the EU has to take care that development policy, as a 
policy field which is not that powerful compared to others, is not marginalised at the 
costs of other policies, for example security policy.18 (Hartmann, 2009: 15) 
As already mentioned, the treaties with the OCTs and later ACPs are among the 
most important examples of EU development policy. These treaties also reflect the 
changes in development and security, especially regarding the connection of these 
two policy fields. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Trade policy is another much quoted policy field, which fits this description. 
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3.6. The EU-ACP Treaties 
 
Shortly after the Treaty of Rome came into effect the colonised African countries one 
after another declared independence from their motherlands. It started with Guinea in 
1958 and only four years later, in 1962, all the other African colonies were 
independent. The convention of Yaoundé of July 1963 can be seen as a reaction of 
the former colonial powers in Europe to keep the connections tight after the 
decolonisation process. (Broberg, 2011: 2) 
 
3.6.1. The Treaties of Yaoundé 
 
The first Yaoundé Treaty (1963 – 1969) regulated aid and preferential market 
access19 between the EC and 18 African countries. Most of these countries could be 
assigned to France´s sphere of influence. It was based on previous agreements 
between the EEC states and the African countries. Therefore it cannot be considered 
a milestone but rather a continuation of the already present relations. An important 
issue in Yaoundé was the recognition of the national sovereignty of the African 
countries.  
In 1969 Yaoundé II came into force which only introduced cosmetic changes but 
included new countries from the Mediterranean, Latin America and Asia. This 
enlargement made it a Treaty between the EEC and the ACP.  
The Yaoundé agreements also established institutions, namely the Association 
Council, Association Committee, Parliamentary Conference and a Court of 
Arbitration, which all were practically toothless. (Bartels, 2007: 722f)  
During Yaoundé I and II a decline in trade was noticeable between the EEC and the 
associated countries. This was due to the connection between the former colonial 
                                                 
19 This preferential access was seen in the reduction and even abolishment of tariffs as well as quotas 
on goods, especially these important for the development countries. 
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powers and the ACP getting looser. It led to more economic exchange with other 
countries due to competitive market measures. (Bartels, 2007: 727) In terms of 
influence of the former colonial powers not much changed. Especially France was 
still a mighty actor and maintained military bases in many former colonised countries. 
 
3.6.2. The Treaties of Lomé 
 
The convention following Yaoundé was Lomé I in 1975 which incorporated 21 new 
countries20, many of them from the Commonwealth. (Hoebink, 2004: 27) The 
reciprocity principle, which was an important cornerstone in the Yaoundé Convention, 
was abandoned and replaced by a non-reciprocity approach which should ensure 
that the new attending countries receive fair treatment in comparison with the 
countries from Yaoundé. (Bartels, 2007: 733) An important introduction in Lomé I was 
STABEX which put earnings of important commodities like coffee and cocoa on a 
solid ground by granting the developing countries stable prices for their exporting 
goods. 
Following Lomé I (1975 – 1979) was Lomé II (1980 – 1985) which did not differ much 
from the first Lomé Convention but introduced SYSMIN, which helped stabilising the 
prices of mining products. (Maennig, 1988: 35ff) 
Lomé III was in effect from 1985 to 1990 and was signed by 66 developing countries. 
(Hoebink, 2004: 31) Issues concerning human rights were included in this convention 
for the first time.  
Lomé IV (1990 – 2000) went a step further concerning human rights by talking about 
the obligations of the contracting countries and by providing financial resources for 
human rights promotion. In 1995 the EU member states decided that all new 
contracts signed with ACP countries have to include the compliance of human rights 
which led to a revision of the paragraphs concerning this topic in Lomé IV. 
Democracy, the rule of law and human rights were now demanded from the Lomé 
                                                 
20 In total 46 countries signed the Lomé convention with the EEC. 
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countries, otherwise sanctions could be imposed for non-compliance. (Bartels, 2007: 
738)  
Lomé IV is therefore considered to be the first ACP-EU contract to acknowledge the 
connection of security and development by including these mechanisms to protect 
the citizens of the ACP states. 
During the 25 years of the Lomé Conventions the biggest part of aid was received by 
countries in sub-Sahara Africa which got 78 per cent of all funds. (Cox and Chapman, 
1999) 
3.6.3. The Treaties of Cotonou 
 
In 2000 the Cotonou agreement followed Lomé IV. The content of this agreement 
was surprising as both STABEX and SYSMIN were thrown out and replaced by more 
results based aid mechanisms with tight links to good governance and the 
compliance of basic human rights. It is clear that in this agreement the European 
Union had a more powerful voice than the ACP countries, as all the important 
changes are clearly in favour of the member states of the EU. (Hoebink, 2004: 33) It 
is also noticeable that with Cotonou security issues got more prominent in this 
agreement as a new focus on conflict prevention and domestic politics could be 
noticed. (Carbone, 2008: 334)  
In December 2010 Cotonou II was ratified. Once again, the revision included mostly 
cosmetic changes but two points have to be highlighted. In Cotonou II a new focus 
on the connection between security and fragility can be seen as the EU included that 
this condition harms development. The other important inclusion is the recognition of 
climate change which can have severe effects on the poorest countries and its 
inhabitants. (European Commission, 2010b) Cotonou II is based on three principles, 
which are political dialogue, trade- and economic cooperation and development aid. 
In former treaties the shortcomings in the political regions were criticised and with 
these changes the EU tried to take this point into account as the political dialogue for 
the partner countries to receive development aid is essential nowadays. (Faria, 2004: 
31) 
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4. Security Policy of the EU 
 
4.1. 1951 to Maastricht 
 
Like the development policy, the idea of a European security policy started in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. The first sectors which were integrated within 
Europe and were already important for security were coal and steel within the ECSC 
in 1951. At first glance, this agreement, which was concluded between France, West 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and The Netherlands, does not have anything 
to do with security issues but coal and steel were and are very important materials for 
military build-up. This agreement should keep Germany from starting a war again.  
After this successful project the French, under Prime Minister Pleven, proposed a 
European Defence Community (EDC) which was highly welcomed by the other 
ECSC countries. It never came into effect though as ironically the ratification process 
in the French senate failed as it was feared that the supranational approach could 
weaken the position of France.  
In 1957 the Treaty of Rome was signed and founded the EEC, which can be marked 
as the birth of the European Union. The newly established community revived the 
idea of a security and defence cooperation. The so called ‘Fouchet Plan’21 could 
have been the predecessor of the CFSP in 1962 but the negotiations failed because 
of two reasons. The United Kingdom was excluded as it only joined the Union in 
1973. The general opinion was that cooperation in this field within Europe should not 
take place without the United Kingdom. The second reason was the anti-US 
undertone of the French De Gaulle administration at that time which was not 
conceived positively among the other member states. They thought that France 
wanted to weaken the NATO through this cooperation. (Cameron, 1999: 16)  
Even though the Fouchet Plan failed, it laid the foundations for future talks in this 
political field. In 1969, after the resignation of de Gaulle, the idea of the political 
                                                 
21 Christian Fouchet was the French ambassador in Denmark at the time. 
The Security-Development Nexus in the European Union 
34 
integration within the EU was picked up again and led to the discussion of a 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) which should give the EEC a heavier weight in 
international politics. The French did not directly oppose the idea but insisted on 
placing the EPC outside of the competencies of the EEC to prevent incorporation in 
the community framework which could decrease the influence of the nation states in 
this sensitive policy field. The EPC was established under this condition and led to a 
tighter cooperation in security questions which can be seen as a first success in 
reaching the objective of ‘speaking with one voice’. The mechanism was still very 
slow and too shiftless to play a major part regarding the trouble spots in the world. 
(Cameron, 1999: 17)  
During the time of the 1960s and 1970s the idea of a powerful Commission in the 
area of foreign policy was inconceivable, especially for France, the United Kingdom 
and Denmark. This position changed over time as respect arose for the Commission 
which led to an increased legitimacy. (Nuttall, 1996: 130) Finally the result of the 
Paris Summit of 1974 gave the advocates of a joint security policy hope, as an 
interest in cooperation in that political field arose. (Nuttall, 2005: 94) 
Some improvements happened, the most important being the creation of a troika 
which gave the chairmanship of the EPC to the present EEC Presidency, assisted by 
the former and next country in this cycle. The EPC got more confident which led to 
the imposition of sanctions on the Soviet Union22, Argentina23, South Africa’s 
Apartheid Regime and Iraq24. These steady steps led to a partly Europeanisation of 
security issues. The idea of joint interventions or a European army was however still 
a taboo and therefore not planned at this time. 
Until 1987, when the EPC was lifted into the Treaty (Art. 30 of the SEA), it was very 
informal and had no legal basis. By including it into the SEA it was given formality 
and codified procedures. Still, the EPC was only considered a forum for discussions 
about security topics as it did not have the power or legitimacy to decide on military 
                                                 
22 The sanctions were justified by the introduction of martial law in Poland in 1981 by the USSR. 
23 Sanctions were imposed on Argentina because of the invasion of the Falklands. 
24 The regime of Saddam Hussein was sanctioned because he invaded Kuwait. 
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matters of the member states. (Cameron, 1999: 18) Finding solutions could take very 
long due to the unanimity rule and the different interests of the involved countries.  
The collapse of the USSR in 1989 had a huge impact on the common foreign policy 
as the changing world demanded a changing foreign and security policy within the 
Union. France and Germany laid the cornerstone of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) at the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1991 which 
finally led to the CFSP within the Treaty of Maastricht. (Cameron, 1999: 22f)  
The Treaty led to a further communisation of the Union through the introduction of the 
pillar system which made the EU subordinate to the European Community (EC), the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Judicial Co-operation in 
Criminal Matters (PJCC). (Gruber, 2008: 65) 
 
4.2. The Time of Maastricht 
 
In Title V, Art. 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), or Maastricht Treaty, the 
definition of the newly introduced CFSP was published. The main goals were  
- ‘to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and 
integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter, 
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, 
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with 
the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on 
external borders, 
- to promote international cooperation, 
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ (European Commission, 2006) 
It is also noted that the member states should only take decisions which reflect the 
spirit of loyalty and solidarity to further strengthen the CFSP. Very important for the 
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CFSP was the inclusion of the so called Petersberg Tasks which provided a 
framework for 
‘[...] humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces 
in crisis management, including peacemaking’. (Western European Union Council of 
Ministers, 1992)  
The Petersberg Tasks were a reaction to changed security perceptions and 
introduced means to be able to react fast to changing security situations. (Pagani, 
1998: 737) 
The Maastricht Treaty effectively founded the European Union and the pillar structure 
which led to CFSP being pillar II. From the beginning the CFSP was 
intergovernmental and 
‘[...] shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the 
eventual framing of a common defence policy [...].’ (European Commission, 1992) 
In 1998 the St. Malo Declaration was signed by France and the United Kingdom 
which pointed out that, despite the CFSP being in force, the EU still has too little 
capabilities regarding crisis management: 
‘The realization of Europe’s military weakness with regard to the Kosovo crisis, which 
convinced all governments of the need to develop an EU crisis management 
capacity; the fundamental change of British Policy; and the supportive attitude of the 
United States.’ (quoted from Cameron, 1999: 80) 
The French and British pointed out that the EU needed better resources to play a 
more important role in international politics which led to the Joint Action (JA) and 
Common Positions which were introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. (Laursen, 2010: 
13) 
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4.3. The Time of Amsterdam 
 
The treaty following Maastricht had to work on the CFSP as it proved to be not 
community friendly as the cooperation between the governments, the decision 
making bodies and the organic structure of the Union left a lot to be desired. 
A big milestone in the history of the CFSP was the mutual consent on coherence 
between the CFSP and other policy fields concerning it. (Neisser and Verschraegen, 
2001: 115) The second important innovation was the installation of a High 
Representative (HR) for the CFSP in 1999 to ‘add a face’ to the CFSP and make 
European foreign policy more visible outside the EU. The post was held by Javier 
Solana until the Lisbon Treaty came into force. With the HR the Union tried to escape 
the so called ‘expectation-capability gap’25 to be recognised in the world as a political 
power. 
During the time of Amsterdam the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 was published. At the 
summit in Helsinki the member states agreed to work towards being able to deploy a 
European Rapid Reaction Force of 60.000 soldiers within 60 days to manage the 
Petersberg Tasks. (Lindstrom, 2005: 1ff) This strategy paper was seen as a big step 
towards a European army. In times were no Petersberg tasks have to be fulfilled 
these soldiers should be stationed in their home countries serving their nation. 
Another edition was the introduction of Common Strategies by the Amsterdam 
Treaty. (Laursen, 2010: 13) 
The next big step was going to be the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 
shortly followed by the first ever European military mission in Macedonia (Operation 
Concordia), which used NATO equipment and assets and was rated a success. 
(Kühne, 2009: 9) 
 
                                                 
25 For information regarding this term I would like to refer you to Bale, 1999 
The Security-Development Nexus in the European Union 
38 
4.4. The Time of Nice 
 
With the Treaty of Nice the military spectrum of the Union was strengthened with new 
permanent political and military structures introduced namely the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the 
European Union Military Staff (EUMS). Also the system of qualified majority voting 
(QMV) was extended to more decision making areas including the PSC in civilian 
aspects of crisis management operations. (Republic of Slovenia, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2011)  
During the time of the Treaty of Nice the cooperation within the CFSP pillar could be 
intensified by improving the coherence between CFSP and the EC. The Parliament 
and the Commission were also more included in the CFSP with the HR being the link 
between these institutions. (Gruber, 2008: 68) These changes and the newly 
introduced bodies further improved the EU´s ability for working with international 
organisations like the UN, the OECD and the NATO. With Nice the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) became legally a part of the CFSP which 
expanded the EU´s scope of crisis management operations. (Fischer, 2009: 8) 
The proposal of a European Rapid Reaction Force from the time of Amsterdam was 
abandoned when in 2004 the new idea of the so called EU Battlegroups (EUBGs) 
came up. The 2010 Headline Goal demanded that a Battlegroup consisting of around 
1.500 soldiers should be available at very short notice to be deployed at any time. 
Until 2007 there was only one Battlegroup in place every half a year, from then on 
two of them were ready at the same time. Most Battlegroups in the past consisted of 
soldiers from at least 2 nations, sometimes even more. Every group has the objective 
to respond to a crisis or a request by the UN within 10 days. This mechanism is still in 
charge and there are no signs that they will be abandoned in the foreseeable future 
even if no Battlegroup was ever deployed. (Keatinge and Tonra, 2009: 20) 
The most important document of the time when Nice was in force was the European 
Security Strategy which was important for several reasons. 
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4.4.1. The European Security Strategy: A logical step 
 
The European Security Strategy can be seen as the next important step after the St. 
Malo Convention, the sad role the EU played in the Kosovo conflict26 and the 
disparity of opinions on the on-going Iraq war.  
It was influenced by three events: The end of the separation of Germany, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001. (Fischer, 
2009: 11) 
The overarching goal for the ESS is described in the document: 
‘As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the 
world's Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is inevitably a global 
player [...] it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in 
building a better world.’ (Council of the European Union, 2003) 
The ESS defines five threats to the security of the European Union which are 
international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional 
conflicts, state failure and organised crime.  
Three strategic goals should lead to eradicating these threats. If threats occur, these 
should be countered with the full range of available instruments immediately. The 
second goal states that acting in a global manner as well as concentrating on the 
borders of the EU is important while the third principle strengthens the commitment of 
multilateralism and the rule of international law. (Heusgen, 2004: 6) 
The ESS was always considered more important internally and less outwardly 
oriented. This explains why the ESS is not a concrete strategic document but more a 
guideline for the CFSP with a non-binding character. (Meyer, 2008: 25) 
 
                                                 
26 The EU was not able to react in a proper way during the violent outbreak in Yugoslavia in 1999 as 
its current security policy capabilities were limited. This event led to the acceleration of the process 
towards a CFSP. (The Amsterdam Treaty: A comprehensive guide 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/index_en.htm) 
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4.5. The Time of Lisbon 
 
In the Lisbon Treaty four major changes in wording concerning the security policy can 
be spotted compared to the TEU. 
Under the Lisbon Treaty the CFSP is based on 
‘[...] the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' 
actions.’ (Article 127, Lisbon Treaty, amending Art. 11 TEU)  
Member states should 
‘[...] comply with the Union's action’ within the CFSP.’ (Art. 127, Lisbon Treaty, 
amending Article 11 TEU) 
‘Determining a common approach [...]’ 
is very important. (Art. 135, Lisbon Treaty, amending Art. 16 TEU) 
It is also written in the Lisbon Treaty that 
‘Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any 
commitment which could affect the Union’s interests, each Member State shall 
consult the others [...]. Member States shall ensure [...] that the Union is able to 
assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show 
mutual solidarity. [...] The diplomatic missions of the Member States and the 
delegations of the Union in third countries and at international organisations shall co-
operate and shall contribute to formulating and implementing the common approach.’ 
(Article 135, Treaty of Lisbon, amending Article 16 TEU) 
These changes made it clear that a comprehensive approach becomes even more 
important and that every country should have the good for all other countries in mind 
before taking action in this policy area. 
The biggest reform in the Lisbon Treaty was clearly the abolishment of the pillar 
structure. This affected the foreign and security policy strongly as the CFSP was one 
pillar by its own. Even though it vanished, the structures stayed intact. Before the 
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Treaty of Lisbon was signed the coherence between the First pillar´s (EC) external 
relations and the Second pillar´s (CFSP) foreign and security policy was problematic 
at times. The new and improved post of a ‘High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy of the European Union’27 (HR), currently held by Catherine 
Ashton, is responsible for both external economic relations and CFSP issues. She is 
also vice-president of the Commission and chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Council. 
By nature this post and the responsibility it holds increases the coherence of 
institutions which are under the hat of the HR in comparison to the previous treaties 
which worked with the pillar structure. (Laursen, 2010: 6) The HRs task is to lead the 
CFSP, to formulate and prepare policy proposals and to implement decisions taken in 
this area. The duties also involve being the key coordinator for civilian and military 
instruments in crisis management. (Hynek, 2011: 83) As the power and 
responsibilities of the HR were expanded a new institution was founded to assist the 
HR from now on: The External Action Service (EEAS). It was created to increase the 
vertical coherence28 between the CSFP and the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP)29. It is comprised of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability 
(CPCC), the EUMS, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and 
the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen). (Hynek, 2011: 84) 
There are still specific rules and procedures in force for the CFSP, which lead to the 
assumption that the second pillar is still existent. Unanimity is still the most used 
voting mechanism (Art. 1 TEU) and the European Court of Justice cannot operate 
within CFSP. (Laursen, 2010: 9) The interval of the debates within the European 
Parliament (EP) on CFSP and the CSDP matters has increased to twice a year 
instead of only once. (Wessels and Bopp, 2008: 14) The CFSP still does not see the 
EP as legitimate for coordinating it but rather the member states themselves in form 
of governments and diplomats. The European Council is still much more important in 
the field of CFSP as it identifies the interests, objectives and general guidelines for 
                                                 
27 Art. 9E, 13A, 14, 19 TEU describe this new post. 
28 Vertical coherence refers to the consistency between the policies within the European Union 
regarding European security policy in this case. (Carbone, 2008: 326) 
29 CSDP is the former ESDP. The transition was geared by the wish to increase coherence through 
institutional improvement. For further information see Hynek, 2011: 81ff 
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the CFSP (see Article 2 TEU). (Wessels and Bopp, 2008: 15) Nowadays the CFSP 
gears more towards joint civilian and military operations and is thus broadened.  
The Lisbon Treaty also extends the Petersberg Tasks, which now also include Joint 
Disarmament Operations, Post-conflict stabilisation and placed a bigger focus on 
fighting terrorism by military and civilian means. (Laursen, 2010: 14f) Enhanced 
Cooperation should speed up missions30 while Permanent Structured Cooperation31 
as well as the ‘Entrustment of Task to a Group of States’ which can be referred to as 
a ‘Coalition of the Able and Willing’32, were introduced to make the Union more 
flexible. 
Another new implementation in the Treaty of Lisbon was the division of the former 
GAERC into two new bodies, the General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Foreign 
Affairs Council (FAC)33. The GAC is now responsible for preparing the meetings of 
the EC with its President and the Commission and has a rotating Presidency which 
will not lead to much continuity as the EC has a full time president. The FAC on the 
other hand has a fixed chairperson (HR) who is appointed for 5 years which fits better 
with the years President of the EC who is appointed for 2.5 years. (Wessels and 
Bopp, 2008: 17) 
All in all the Treaty of Lisbon brought many new aspects to the foreign and security 
policy and especially the CFSP, most of them positive. Due to the increase in use of 
QMV, efficiency should go up with fewer deadlocks produced. The new permanent 
President of the European Council should lead to a steady political direction which 
helps to predict the European security policy. (Laursen, 2010: 19) The HR and the 
abolishment of the pillar structure on the other hand should lead to more coherence 
and an improved external perception by the world. 
  
                                                 
30 Art. 329(2) TFEU 
31 Art. 42 TEU 
32 Art. 44 TEU 
33 Art. 16 (6) TEU 
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5. The Interweavement of Development and 
Security 
 
5.1. Connected from the Beginning 
 
The connection between development and security can be traced back to the birth of 
the development term.34 Former President of the United States of America, Harry S. 
Truman, was a very important figure for development as well as security policy. With 
his speech in 1949 it is commonly accepted that he started development policy by 
addressing that the ‘American Way’ should be an example on how to overcome 
poverty. The idea of a development policy was therefore born in a time when the 
Cold War started. This helps to understand why development policy was connected 
with security from the beginning on. In the quote 
‘Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous 
areas.’ (quoted from Escobar, 1995: 3) 
it is hinted that security deliberations played an important role during the birth of 
development policy. The Marshall Plan, which marked the start of development policy 
in real politics, was influenced by security thinking as the United States feared that 
communism could take over Western Europe and other parts of the world. It is 
obvious that only nations compliant to the respective ideology could benefit from 
development funds. (Leffler, 1992: 157ff)  
The link between development and security is thus not a recent phenomenon but 
already existed for decades. After the Cold War both policy areas were broadened. 
Security policy was not centred on the opposing superpower anymore and was 
therefore forced to find new areas of application. The field was increasingly opened 
for economic, environmental and state stability concerns from now on. State centred 
                                                 
34 Due to Clemens Six it can be even traced back to the start of the colonial age, as in those days it 
was also important for the security of the colonial rulers that the native people do not revolt. This led to 
some sort of development policy even if it was very different from today and its only aim was to keep 
the people quiet. This policy served a very nationalistic security approach. (Six, 2007: 5) 
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approaches got less relevant while security policy which targeted the individual grew 
more important with Human Security entering politics. 
Also development policy changed and widened after the Cold War, mainly because 
the results during the 1980s were disappointing35. The important change within the 
development sphere was to move away from a purely economic view to the needs of 
the individual as well as placing great emphasis on good governance, human rights 
and security issues. (Bueger and Vennesson, 2009: 8) It must be pointed out that 
especially until the 1990s other political areas like environment and trade were at 
least equally important for the development sector. This can especially be seen in the 
EU-ACP Treaties where trade issues were always prioritised and only recently 
security issues, like good governance and the demanded support on the ‘War on 
Terror’ got included into the treaties. 
During the last two decades both policy areas have undergone fundamental changes 
in meaning and connection with each other. These changes forced the development 
and security policy within the European Union to work with each other as their 
political fields are tied together in comprehensive mandates abroad and by the 
coherence imperative of the EU. Nowadays peacebuilding missions cannot be 
successful with only military means and therefore have to include development 
instruments to reach sustainable peace. This obligatory inclusion of a development 
component makes security policy integrated and comprehensive. (Klingebiel, 2006: 
3) 
The 1990s were a hard time for development policy as the credibility and legitimation 
of the policy was at stake due to the unsuccessfulness of the 1980s. Crisis 
prevention and conflict processing were seen as new fields for the development 
policy to earn back trust and credibility. From the beginning of this reorientation 
phase there was a fear within the development community that this shift could push 
major topics and values of development policy, most prominently poverty reduction, 
in the background. However this reorganisation was not only demanded from people 
outside the development community but also from within, which may come as a 
surprise because the resources were already scarce to handle traditional 
                                                 
35 The 1980s were labelled ‘the lost decade of development’. 
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development tasks. A broadening of the development policy area was therefore seen 
critical because of missing capacities in the already overloaded development field. 
(Maihold, 2005: 31) 
 
5.2. Positioning of Development towards Security 
 
Both security and development want the well-being of the human but try to achieve 
that goal with different approaches. It is important for both policy areas to find out the 
methods, instruments and means of the other political field to identify commonalities 
and differences. Nowadays the biggest political intersections between security and 
development are seen in peacebuilding, human security and the ‘War on Terror’. 
(Bueger and Vennesson, 2009: 10) 
Due to Klingebiel and Roehder development policy can position itself in three ways 
towards the security policy: 
- It can pursue a strategy of distance which aims at staying away from the 
security policy to gain more independence. This should lead to a better 
development policy which targets its basic goals and the MDGs. The negative 
aspects of that strategy are that development policy could suffer a loss of 
importance in international politics and that it is harder to influence opinions 
and politics outside its sphere of power.  
- It can also choose a strategy of cooperation which tries to find coherent 
approaches for problems regarding security and development. The positive 
aspect is that development has more influence in security related aspects than 
with a distance strategy. Then again too many compromises and concessions 
could weaken the development policy, which could lead to a securitisation of 
development. Another possible negative effect is seen in traditional 
development losing funds to security related projects.  
- The strategy of complementarity can be seen as a mixture of the two above. 
Strategic partnerships and cooperation should be entered in fields where they 
are productive and do not lead to overlapping. This means that the security 
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aspect should not work in the defined space of development and vice versa. 
(Klingebiel and Roehder, 2004: 354f) 
Regarding military interventions the International Council on Human Rights from 
2001 knows three broad categories on how development policy can stand towards 
military interventions. (Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & 
Humanitarian Assistance, 2003) 
- First of all the development community can find them never acceptable and 
always opposes them. 
- On the other hand the development community can stand neutral towards a 
military intervention by never demanding them but also never publicly 
opposing them when they are carried out.  
- A military force can also be seen as acceptable in some circumstances, for 
example when crimes against humanity are happening (Barry and Jefferys, 
2002: 9) 
Within official documents it can be seen in more detail on how the European 
development policy stands towards the security policy and vice versa. 
 
5.3. Important Documents for the Nexus 
 
With the new century a new era of development cooperation was established with 
improvement in the areas of management36 and content37 of European development 
cooperation. The outcome of these shifts on the development side was seen in 
documents like the ‘European Consensus on Development’ in 2005 (European 
Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006), ‘The Consensus on Development and the 
Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour’ in 2007 (European 
Commission, 2007a), which committed the member states and the institutions to a 
common view in terms of development cooperation and implementation. (Carbone, 
                                                 
36 The delivery of better aid took place in a faster way. 
37 Poverty reduction was the main goal. 
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2008: 332) The ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’ by the OECD was also very 
influential within the EU. Important papers regarding security were the European 
Security Strategy (ESS), the Helsinki Headline Goal and the Headline Goal 2010.  
Regarding development and security the ESS said that 
‘[...] there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and 
without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’ 
(European Council, 2008: 12) 
The European Consensus on Development also identifies insecurity and violent 
conflicts as the biggest obstacles for development and the MDGs. It comments that a 
tighter coordination between development policy and security policy, which is seen as 
essential to stabilise failed states, should be carried out. (Wagner, 2008: 38) The 
European Council Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy 
links these statements and notes that 
‘[...] the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there 
cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without 
development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’ (European 
Council, 2008: 12).  
The Paris Declaration was a major paper for development policy and led to the 
‘International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding’ which got more concrete 
and designated with goals that should be tackled to achieve development and 
security. In the paper it is pointed out that objectives must be produced 
‘[...] that address the root causes of conflict and fragility (AAA 2008) by connecting 
different policy communities (development, defence, diplomacy).’ (UN Peacebuilding 
Support Office, 2009: 2) 
The OECD devoted their fifth Principle of Good International Engagement in Fragile 
States to the important matter of development-security coordination regarding fragile 
and states: 
‘[...] the political-security-development nexus: The political, security, economic and 
social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others. 
International actors should move to support national reformers in developing unified 
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planning frameworks for political, security, humanitarian, economic and development 
activities at a country level.’ (OECD, 2007: 2) 
In 2004 the DAC of the OECD made it possible through the ‘Security System Reform 
and Good Governance: Policy and Good Practice’ that parts of the Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) were now creditable as ODA. While for example training in human 
rights questions and democracy are understandable and could definitely be 
discussed other areas like the elaboration on planning documents for the armed 
forces and training for police forces are questionable at least. (Wagner, 2008: 52) 
The EU-ACP contracts were always important for the EU development policy since 
the 1960s. Nowadays these contracts also reflect the development-security nexus 
quite visibly. Over the years a strong connection between receiving development aid 
grew with the inclusion of security aspects. This could be especially seen in the 
revision of the Cotonou Agreement in 2005 between the EU and 78 ACP countries. 
The willingness of the ACP states to fight terrorism and the distribution of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction and to be a ‘good government’ was essential for the EU to sign 
the treaty. In the event of non-compliance on these areas it is even possible that aid 
is being suspended. (Wagner, 2008: 44) 
 
5.3.1. Points of Contact in Civil-Military Missions 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon with its innovations paved the way for a more integrated Union 
in terms of military-civilian operations. The biggest obstacle nowadays is not the 
inability of the EU to achieve civil-military cooperation but to handle the different 
interests within the EU. (Hynek, 2011: 98) 
When the pillar structure was still existent within the EU, the peacebuilding efforts 
were a great example of cross-pillar policy, as it involved institutions from pillar I and 
II. Pillar I provided the Commission with the monopoly in initiative without the member 
states having the power to veto. In pillar II the Commission together with the Council 
shared the power of initiative with unanimity required. In pillar I the EP had decision 
making power together with the Council. In pillar II on the other hand the EP did not 
have this power in terms of decision making. (Sicurelli, 2008: 220)  
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Pillar I included development assistance, conflict prevention and conflict 
management without lethal implications and the Commission had the right to initiate 
operations in these fields. Decision making was done via QMV and the EP. 
Implementation was carried out by the Commission via budget management.  
Pillar II on the other hand, included civilian and military missions with lethal 
implications. Decision making was carried out by the Council via the unanimity rule 
and implementation lay with the member states, the current Presidency, the HR for 
CFSP or the Commission via budget management. 
There was also a grey area which included peacekeeping operations without lethal 
implications and purely civilian operations. (Sicurelli, 2008: 221) 
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced several bodies which should help in linking the 
military and civilian sides of the foreign policy. Examples are the Joint Situation 
Centre, the EUMS, the EUMC and the Politico Military Group (PMG). 
Recently two major developments can be noticed in the context of civil-military 
missions of the EU. First of all, further specialisation in some traditional tasks, for 
example policing, has occurred. Second, new types of missions have been carried 
out, for example cases with goals like the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and 
disarmament or demobilization which range wide into the civil arm of conflict 
management. (Hynek, 2011: 86) 
During the 1990s the civilian power in solving conflicts was seen as the strongest 
instrument of the European Union, the military option was only secondary. With 
including a civil section in the newly founded CFSP a new competitor arose for the 
development policy field which was connected to the military as well as to the 
traditional development spectrum. (Ehrhart, 2007: 7)  
One step in the direction of a further integration of security issues into development 
policy was taken in 2004, when several security programmes were included into ODA 
accountability.38 These changes did not include the costs for the military operations 
                                                 
38 These were the administration of security expenses, the strengthening of the role of the civil society 
within the security system, the prevention and demobilisation of child soldiers, security sector reform, 
crisis prevention and solution and small arms. (Wagner, 2008: 3) 
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themselves but resulted in cross-financing of security issues by development aid. 
This development can be seen as either positive or negative but it has to be pointed 
out that more money for security means less money for ‘real’ development aid, such 
as poverty reduction efforts, if no new money is induced for the European 
development policy. (Wagner, 2008: 3) It is estimated that if full accountability of 
Peace Support Operations (PSOs) of the UN would be possible, the amount of ODA 
would increase by 12 per cent worldwide without any additional investments in this 
area. If other military interventions, not led by the United Nations, would be 
accountable the increase of ODA would amount to around 25 per cent for Germany 
and even 44 per cent for the United States. (Wagner, 2008: 4) Measures which 
appoint to about 30 per cent of the ODA can be already seen as questionable 
today.39 If this development continues it will most likely result in more short military 
interventions in the future which would gain at the expense of long and preventive 
civilian operations. (Burghardt and Pietz, 2006: 4) 
The use of military assets, for example transport via airplane to deliver aid, convoys 
for protection of development personnel and information sharing are seen as the 
three most common contact points for civilian and military personnel in crisis areas. 
The superiority in transportation equipment can be positive for the development side 
when departing to a country while the second point, the military escorts, are being 
seen as highly problematic because it can lead to civilian development workers not 
being seen as neutral and impartial anymore40. Sometimes it is necessary though 
and even explicitly asked for by development organisations. The sharing of 
information on the other hand is very important for both sectors and not likely to 
change perceived neutrality as the citizens of the country where the mission takes 
place will hardly know about information sharing. (Barry and Jefferys, 2002: 5) 
During the last decade civilian development cooperation can be seen as much more 
integrated and legitimated in security issues as it used to be. The major problem with 
this trend is seen in sometimes contrasting framework conditions in comparison with 
                                                 
39 Costs for foreign students or for asylum seekers and refugees are examples of ‘phantom aid’, which 
can be a big part of the ODA of a country. (Wagner, 2008: 5) 
40 It is important to note that impartiality and neutrality are not synonyms but mean quite different 
things. If an actor is neutral it should not affect the political sphere at all, while an impartial force can 
intervene as long as it is in an even-handed manner. 
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the development cooperation provided by the security policy. The security policy has 
a narrower time horizon and demands quick results, which leads to less quality and a 
focus on quick impacts in the working area. Traditional development policy on the 
other hand leans towards giving its personnel more time to do their work. This policy 
is using approaches which do not have a huge impact in the beginning but are 
geared towards sustainable development. (Burghardt and Pietz, 2006: 3) Coherent 
policies aim to close or at least decrease that gap and make cooperation between 
security and development policy possible.  
 
5.4. The Coherence Term and the Development-Security 
Nexus 
 
Coherence has been a big topic in the European Union, especially within the last 
decade. The important preparatory work has already started with the signing of the 
SEA, which introduced the European EPC and marking the first small steps towards 
coherent policies. In Art. 30(5) of the SEA it is written that 
‘[...] external policies of the European Community and the policies agreed in the 
European Political Cooperation must be consistent.’  
In this context it should be noted that consistency means coherence as the term 
coherence had not yet entered the political vocabulary.  
The legal basis for the coherence term, even if it also was not explicitly named within 
the EU, is to be found in Article 3 and Article 13 of the TEU and also in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in Article 178. Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (Title I, Common 
Provisions) says: 
‘The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a 
whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development 
policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such 
consistency and shall cooperate to this end.’ 
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Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union (Title V, Provisions on a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy) says: 
‘The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the 
Union.’ 
Article 178 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Title XX, Development Cooperation) states: 
‘The Community shall take account of the objectives referred to [the development 
policy] in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing 
countries.’ 
The coherence imperative of the Union was influenced by the development as well as 
the foreign policy. Articles 178 and 13, which deal with the EU´s development policy 
and the foreign and security policy, are subordinates to Article 3. (Ashoff, 2005: 28ff) 
Within the last two decades much has changed regarding development cooperation 
and coherence. Until the 1980s most development cooperation was a state to state 
transfer of funds to help the recipient country in social and especially economic 
areas. From the 1990s on development cooperation started to include a broader 
spectrum of political areas such as human rights. It was also no longer solely a state 
to state affair but included the activities of the civil society like non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). (Carbone, 2008: 327) The increasing importance of 
coherence was then reflected in the establishment of the Policy Coherence for 
Development term. 
 
5.4.1. Policy Coherence for Development 
 
The DAC of the OECD helped the term to get political recognition, by establishing a 
definition for Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) which is widely used 
nowadays:  
‘Policy Coherence for Development means working to ensure that the objectives and 
results of a government's (or institution's) development policies are not undermined 
by other policies of that government (or institution), which impact on developing 
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countries, and that these other policies support development objectives, where 
feasible.’ (OECD, 2005: 28) 
The MDGs are one of the Union´s most important goals for which to reach it was 
seen essential to achieve coherence, especially between development and 
security.41 For this matter PCD was established. 
The Commission and Council found out that there are three conditions needed to 
meet the MDGs by 2015. One of them is to support the development efforts by 
increasing coherence between the development policy and all policy fields 
associated with it.42 (Obrovsky, 2007: 4)  
First discussions about this topic started in 1992 but it took more than a decade until 
it got relevant. (Obrovsky, 2007: 13) The big breakthrough for PCD came in 2005 
when the work on the European Consensus on Development began. 
Already in Part I (The EU Vision of Development) of the Consensus it is stated that 
‘It reaffirms EU commitment to poverty eradication, ownership, partnership, delivering 
more and better aid and promoting policy coherence for development.’ (European 
Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006: 2) 
In that part PCD even got its own sub item with number 6. There it says: 
‘The EU is fully committed to taking action to advance Policy Coherence for 
Development in a number of areas1. It is important that non-development policies 
assist developing countries' efforts in achieving the MDGs. The EU shall take 
account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements 
which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this commitment a reality, the 
EU will strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and 
mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate resources [...].’ 
                                                 
41 The MDGs gave the aid provided a push and doubled the numbers from 52 billion Euros in 2000 to 
104 billion Euros in 2006 (DAC, 2008). Nevertheless it soon became clear that raising funds would be 
not enough and that the coherence must be improved to properly utilise these funds. This resulted in 
PCD, which was highly welcomed by the DAC of the OECD. (Carbone, 2008: 324) 
42 The other conditions are to achieve the Barcelona commitments, which demand that 0.7 percent of 
the Gross National Income is used for development cooperation and to increase effectiveness of 
development cooperation as stated in the Paris declaration.  
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Another important document and one of the foundations for PCD was a paper by the 
Commission which was picked up by the GAERC to speed up the achievement of the 
MDGs. (European Commission, 2005) The most important section of the paper is 
‘The 12 PCD Commitments’ which also includes security (Point 4). There it says that 
‘The EU will treat security and development as complementary agendas, with the 
common aim of creating a secure environment and of breaking the vicious circle of 
poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political 
structures.’ (GAERC, 2005) 
 
PCD: Important but blurry 
 
It was a major leap forward to bring coherence to the development field but it was 
also seen as very weak and vague. The process, rather than the result, was the goal 
and it was clear that development as a soft policy would have a hard time to persist 
against the more powerful hard policies like trade and security. (Carbone, 2008: 
330)43 
Achieving political coherence within the EU is paved with obstacles as the European 
Union is a highly complex institution. There are supranational policies, like 
development, trade and agriculture which involve the three most important institutions 
of the Union, namely Council, Parliament and the Commission with the latter being by 
far the most powerful in promoting coherence. On the other hand there are 
intergovernmental policies like the foreign and security policy, in which the Council 
should establish coherence. In areas of mixed competencies the member states 
themselves play the most important role in adding coherence, for example within 
environment, transport and energy policy. (Egenhofer, 2006: 6f) 
To make coherence work it is therefore of utter importance to eliminate grey areas of 
legislation and to make sure that every institution knows what its competencies are 
                                                 
43 For more information see Hoebink, 1999 and Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1999. 
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and how far they reach to ensure that the coherence improves or stays intact. 
(Poeschke, 2008: 53) 
In terms of foreign and security policy many politicians and scholars see that 
coherent policies in this field are a necessary precondition for efficacy. ‘Speaking with 
one voice’ is to be seen as important if Europe wants to be taken seriously by the 
world. Incoherence is seen as negative for the Union´s foreign policy as it 
undermines the main goal which is effectiveness. Unanimity in questions of foreign 
policy does not automatically induce effectiveness but it is necessary to help 
legitimising decisions made.44 (Portela and Raube, 2009: 4f) 
With the Amsterdam Treaty still in force PCD got a revaluation as it was decided that 
PCD was no longer only about supranational policies but that it was extended to all 
policy areas within the Union. This approach ought to increase coherence. 
The first semi-annual PCD report was published in 2007 and was surprisingly critical. 
The report pointed out that it positively acknowledged the awareness given to PCD 
but it also said that the ambitious goals were not met. It stated that PCD works better 
in some institutions (Commission) than in others (Council) and that it was not well 
institutionalised in the decision making processes. (European Commission, 2007b: 
19) 
 
5.4.2. Criticism of the Coherence Concept 
 
‘The development community's best option is to embrace coherence, and try to 
influence the security agenda in the direction of human security.’ (Robinson, 2006: 
78f) 
That would be one of the goals of the development policy towards the security policy, 
to steer it in its own direction by making human security a main goal of all missions 
abroad. This is not the reality however and coherence earned some criticism over the 
years. 
                                                 
44 For more info on that topic I would like to refer to Missiroli, 2001.  
The Security-Development Nexus in the European Union 
56 
One of the most important and strongest points against coherence is that the concept 
and the formal commitments are blurry. It sometimes seems that everything should 
be linked to everything and to be 
‘[...] mutually supportive and not subordinate to each other.’ (European Parliament, 
Council, Commission, 2006: 10) 
It is clear that such commitments cannot be reflected in real policy as trade-offs are 
required to make a powerful and functional coherence possible. This ‘everything-
should-be-coherent-with-everything-thinking’ is probably possible in theory but not in 
reality. (Biscop, 2004) 
It must also be admitted that the question is not raised whether increased coherence 
is even always good for the policies involved. It is taken for granted that coherence 
between development and security policy would benefit both. This does not have to 
be the case though. An example is the shift of the Union towards supporting more 
and more MICs where traditional development policy is not an important issue 
anymore. In these countries the focus of the Union is in trade and security questions. 
Most of these flows to the MICs do not have much in common with ‘classic’ 
development aid as money is provided for example to migration programmes, 
terrorism prevention programmes or technical assistance projects. Also the support 
for a dialogue between cultures, which was proposed by the Commission in 2007, 
can be seen sceptical as it can open doors for security strategic programmes without 
benefitting the development policy. (Young, 2008: 13f) 
It has to be pointed out that the approach of security policy and development policy is 
very different by nature, which makes coherence more difficult. The military has a 
political approach and neutrality and impartiality are much harder to achieve and 
communicate. Development policy on the other hand should not be too much 
influenced by politics but focus on the well-being of the human and to apply 
development measures in a balanced way along all people in a certain area. Recent 
EU missions with military means were nearly always accompanied by excessive 
media coverage, which is partly the answer to the question why there are so few 
military operations in politically ‘uninteresting countries’ or dangerous ‘hot zones’. 
Civilian actors on the other hand are active in nearly all countries where poverty is 
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common or conflict is raging, mostly without notice of the world public. (Barry and 
Jefferys, 2002: 19)  
In most cases armed forces will not be seen as neutral and impartial but as partisan 
in contrast to NGOs which are much more often seen as impartial even though they 
have to work in certain political conditions which can make them dependent on policy 
makers. With this in mind it is clear that development policy by NGOs is more likely to 
work for the needs of the public as the political aspect is weaker than with security 
policy. (Burghardt and Pietz, 2006: 2)  
A coherent and tight coordination could also lead to a situation where the civilian 
population and conflict parties lose their view on the development workers as neutral 
and impartial, which can have severe negative effects. The relationship between the 
development personnel and the native people could become less intensive and 
unarmed, non-governmental development workers could get sucked into an armed 
conflict by becoming targets of combatants. Sometimes armed protection of civilian 
personnel is seen as necessary but can comprise impartiality and should be avoided 
if possible. If carried out, the request should always come from the civilian actor and 
has to be carried out by an actor which is not directly involved in the conflict. (Barry 
and Jefferys, 2002: 17) 
 
5.4.3. Possible Solutions of Coherence Problems 
 
Despite wanting to increase coherence it is important to prevent a ‘securitisation’ of 
development policy. Many scholars have highlighted this matter as being of utter 
importance to development policy as it should stay independent from security policy 
while cooperating with it. During the Cold War the ‘securitisation’ was obvious in 
some areas as development aid was only given to states which did follow the ‘right’ 
ideology. During this time development policy can be seen as a tool for security 
policy to tie countries to ones sphere of influence. (Six, 2007: 21) Today such a 
‘securitisation’ is much harder to prove. 
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To avoid problems concerning the tight cooperation between the two political fields, 
due to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 200145, three 
guiding principles on how the civilian side should work with the military side are 
recommended. 
- First of all, humanitarian work should be always done by humanitarian 
organisations and not the military, as civilian engagement is always seen as 
the better alternative compared to military implementation.  
- Civilian NGOs must not work under the command of military actors as 
independence is not met this way. 
- Civilian intervention with development cooperation should always lead to 
maintaining order and improve security as well as the safety of civilians in a 
comprehensive and sustainable way. (Barry and Jefferys, 2002: 16) 
Within the development community it is feared that teaming up with security policy 
could lead to former aims of development, such as poverty reduction and the 
improvement of the quality of life for the individual, being accompanied and in the 
long run replaced by security related topics. This process could lead to a loss of 
importance while development policy´s most important topic, poverty reduction, is 
pushed into the background. To escape this fate, development policy should 
rediscover the MDGs and the poverty goal while cooperating coherently with security 
policy without adopting the high goals of it. (Maihold, 2005: 35ff)  
The development community should also urge the security policy to get more 
sensitive towards development which could lead to an adoption of development 
position and a strengthening of the security sector´s soft power. (Klingebiel and 
Roehder, 2004: 351) 
Even though much criticism is raised regarding the connection and cooperation 
between security and development, this nexus also creates opportunities to break the 
vicious circle of poverty and insecurity and to implement the right development-
                                                 
45 OCHA is a UN secretariat and tries to improve coherence between humanitarian actors. For more 
information see http://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are 
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security mix. Such a mix can fight the root causes of conflict more effectively than 
security and development policy respectively alone. 
 
5.4.4. Coherence and PCD: Conclusion 
 
Coherence and especially the PCD strengthened the position of the EU ‘speaking 
with one voice’ and therefore made the EU as a whole more credible. Development 
policy got more important in certain aspects as this policy field is needed in a 
coherent EU to achieve certain goals, most prominently the MDGs. Without the 
coherence imperative the MDGs are a ‘mission impossible’ as development policy as 
well as security policy alone cannot achieve these goals. In this area coherence is an 
important ally.  Nevertheless promoting and carrying out coherent politics is not an 
easy task, especially with a highly bureaucratic institution like the European Union 
which is home to many different interests and institutions. (Carbone, 2008: 339f) The 
approaches of security and development policy are also very different and want to 
achieve different higher goals. Therefore the coherence between these two areas 
should be balanced and fair, as otherwise the described problems presumably occur. 
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6. Conflict Management of the EU 
 
6.1. Reasons for Conflicts 
 
6.1.1. General Reasons for Conflict 
 
Within the European Union the Council and the PSC are constantly observing all 
regions in the world to find new areas of operation for the European Union. Therefore 
it is important to see early signs of an upcoming conflict. The key is to have credible 
and current information about the situation to react in a proper way. (Anderson and 
Spelten, 2000: 9ff) 
The reasons a conflict breaks out are manifold. There are no definite indicators 
available but there are several issues which can point to a current or future conflict.  
The factors which can lead to conflict can broadly be divided into three groups.  
- Structural factors are seen as one of the most important reasons for violence. 
They include political, economic and cultural factors. A political reason for 
conflict can be that a small group of people have all important positions in a 
government while the majority of the individuals are excluded from the political 
process. Huge economic disparities can also lead to conflict as well as cultural 
differences and clashes between different ethnicities.  
- Dynamic factors are events like periods of transition46, elections, price surges 
on important goods and reforms. These can become triggering events for 
groups and individuals and can lead to violence and conflict. It must be noted 
however that positive dynamic factors like elections can also strengthen peace 
and harmony within a country and can reduce the possibility of violence.  
                                                 
46 Examples are periods in which a transition from autocracy to democracy happens or when power is 
handed over from one person or group to another. 
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- Strategies by groups or individuals to safeguard certain interests or even 
expand them can also lead to conflict. Warlords are a good example as it is in 
their interest that conflicts becomes constant because they are economically 
dependent on it. 
This enumeration of possible reasons for conflict shows that not all causes of need 
have to be structural. Admittedly, these root causes are often found in conflict torn 
regions but they are not mandatory for the breakout of a conflict. (Anderson and 
Spelten, 2000: 4)  
 
6.1.2. Concrete Reasons for Conflict 
 
While structural reasons, dynamic factors and strategies are very broad areas I want 
to proceed with more concrete reasons for conflict. 
 
Economic and Social Situation 
 
It can be observed that countries with low per capita income, low economic growth 
and bad health care systems are more likely to plunge into conflict and violence than 
rich countries or countries with good prospects in these indicators. The social and 
economic situation can be connected with structural issues (Stewart, 2004: 16) 
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Ethnicity 
 
The multi ethnicity within most African countries was and is important to many 
conflicts.47 One of the most obvious examples is the Rwanda genocide during 1994. 
This cause can be linked with structural, as well as dynamic factors.48 
 
Resources 
 
When looking at Africa it can be seen that, while some countries recovered quite well 
from past conflict and have relatively high growth and welfare rates, like for example 
Mozambique. Many states on the other hand, mostly those with rich resources like 
Angola or Congo, are much more fragile.49 (Biekart et al., 2005: 364) The occurrence 
of resources is connected with structural factors and strategies. 
 
Costs of Insecurity 
 
People who join the military or a militia, people who need to flee or are harmed are 
not able to work productively anymore. Large scale conflicts, which take part in the 
economic powerhouses of a country, have greater effect on the costs for society than 
conflicts in smaller, regionally restricted conflicts, which take place in the periphery. It 
can also be observed that in richer economies conflicts have greater and more 
negative effects than in poor countries. These rich countries with consolidated and 
stable institutions on the other hand are more likely to sustain important state 
services, like distribution of medication and food, than countries or regions where 
                                                 
47 It can be observed however that conflict on the basis of ethnic reasons becomes much less likely if 
ethnic diversity exceeds three different groups. (Biekart et al., 2005: 363) 
48 The Rwanda genocide was triggered by the shooting down of the airplane of the Rwandan 
President Juvénal Habyarimana. 
49 It is often said that countries with many natural resources are cursed with them. 
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these services are scarce even in times of peace. (Stewart, 2004: 4) The aftermath of 
these conflicts can start a new one as the unemployment rate is high and it can be 
problematic to introduce the former combatants into the normal economic life. This 
can lead to tensions and more conflict. 
 
Colonialism 
 
Colonialism is often said to be one of the most important root factors even for present 
violent conflicts. It can however explain some conflicts but it certainly is not the most 
important factor nowadays. 
Within the colonialism reason the demarcation is an important aspect. Most of the 
borders were drawn on maps with a ruler by the colonial powers and did not take 
ethnicity or territories into account. These artificial borders contain a huge potential 
for conflicts. Another reason within the discussion is that the colonial powers did 
modernise most countries but only in a way the motherland could benefit from. This 
led to huge disparities between regions which would divide countries in privileged 
and non-privileged areas. (Faria, 2004: 9) Colonialism can be a structural factor for 
conflict. 
 
Foreign Support for Governments 
 
Another factor was and is the support of governments in Africa by Europe, the United 
States of America (USA), China and the USSR and Russia respectively, especially 
with money and military goods. These contributions would strengthen the mostly 
autocratic rulers of the post-colonial area. After the end of the Cold War a general 
decrease in contributions could be noticed, which brought up the question of 
legitimacy of these governments. For many of the conflicts in Africa corrupt and 
centralised governments were seen as, at least partly, responsible, which point at 
structural reasons.  
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Conflicts themselves 
 
While the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was the only ‘classic war’ in recent 
decades, all the other conflicts in Africa after decolonisation can be seen as intrastate 
conflicts, which mostly affected the neighbouring countries. The movement of militia 
forces, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)50 over national borders can 
destabilise or even spread conflict into bordering countries. The struggle for control 
over natural resources like oil or diamonds is sometimes the reason for these 
interstate conflicts. (Faria, 2004: 10) For them all three factors can play an important 
role. 
It is estimated by the British NGO Oxfam, that from 1990 to 2007 the sum of 300 
billion US Dollars was lost in Africa because of insufficient security and conflict which 
also amounts to the development aid received during this time. (Oxfam, 2007: 3) 
Therefore these reasons of conflict have to be taken seriously that these losses do 
not occur in the future. 
 
6.1.3. The negative Side of Aid 
 
‘Do no harm’ by Mary B. Anderson outlined that intervention is not always a good 
thing if conflict, which most likely started because of at least one of the reasons 
stated above, takes place. In this sense also the DAC Principles of Good 
Engagement in Fragile States (2007) say that 
‘International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen 
corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance 
analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards. In each case, international 
decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities following serious cases of 
                                                 
50 Due to the UNHCR IDPs must be distinguished from refugees. While refugees crossed international 
borders, IDPs have fled for similar reasons, but are still in their home country. Therefore IDPs legally 
remain under the protection of their government, even though one possible reason for IDPs to leave 
their home is because of them. See UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html 
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corruption or human rights, violations must be carefully judged for their impact on 
domestic reforms, conflict, poverty and insecurity.’ (OECD, 2007: 1) 
Intervention can thus not only improve conflict situations but can also fuel them, 
which can lead to an even more violent environment or another outbreak after the 
conflict has officially ended. This risk is of special importance for integrated missions 
which include security and development issues as the latter is especially endangered 
in this environment. This can lead to the impartiality of humanitarian actors being 
sacrificed. (Bueger and Vennesson, 2009: 34f) 
It is important to know that it does matter how aid is delivered and that aid is not 
universally positive. During or in the aftermath of a conflict it is essential to know that 
aid can interact with conflict parties in different ways. During a conflict all parties are 
usually still connected with each other, for example by infrastructure, history and 
common values. These connections must be taken into account. Giving aid to a 
certain group or individuals can either inflame the conflict or build bridges between 
people. It is common with aid that poor people are always favoured however. This 
can be seen as a good thing but the question still is how it is provided and to whom? 
(Anderson and Spelten, 2000: 3) 
 
6.2. How the EU carries out Foreign Operations 
 
6.2.1. The Mechanism within the EU 
 
The structures and institutions the EU uses to prepare and carry out their civil-military 
missions abroad resemble much from the NATO mechanisms. 
The first step in preparing a mission is the operational planning. In the advance 
planning, areas where the EU could intervene are chosen by the European Council. 
If an appropriate area for a mission is found a proposal is forwarded to the PSC, 
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which can decide that ‘EU action is appropriate’.51 After this is done the crisis 
response planning takes over for the advance planning and the PSC works out a 
detailed Operational Plan (OPLAN). (Mattelaer, 2008: 11) Then the initiation phase 
begins with the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), which has to be agreed by the 
PSC. For this concept the EUMS drafts the Initiating Directive and sends it to the 
EUMC which adds comments if necessary and forwards it to the PSC. The PSC is 
assisted by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), 
which pools non-military resources and helps with improving coherence, and the 
EUMC, which is responsible for consultation in military issues. (Ehrhart, 2007: 9) This 
directive has to be also accepted by the country where the mission should take place. 
(Barnes, 2002: 7) The CMC is then forwarded to the GAERC and the PSC, where it 
is validated. Also the validation of one of the Military Strategic Options (MSO), which 
are worked out by the EUMS, fall under the responsibility of those two committees. 
The last important decision is that of a JA, which legally establishes the EU mission 
and makes decisions about costs, executing personnel and where the Operation 
Headquarters (OHQ) should be situated. (Mattelaer, 2008: 12) However a JA is not 
sufficient to carry out an international mission as a UN Security Council Resolution is 
also needed. This venture can be a pro forma decision or very difficult to get. (Kühne, 
2009: 11) 
Military CFSP missions are financed by the costs lie where they fall principle. This is 
reasonable as the military component of the European Union is intergovernmental 
and every country can decide how they participate in operations. This means that 
participating countries can steer their costs. The costs which cannot be assigned to a 
specific country, the common costs, are divided due to the ATHENA52 mechanism 
among the countries involved. These are for example costs for headquarters as well 
as for infrastructure. ATHENA will not cover for personnel costs of civilian CFSP 
operations though. These have to be paid by the countries themselves.  
                                                 
51 The PSC is assembled by permanent representatives of the member countries and a representative 
of the Commission, which allows the member countries to include development specific ideas into the 
mission. 
52 For more info on the Athena Mechanism see Council of the European Union: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/financing-of-
csdp-military-operations.aspx 
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If one looks at the past CFSP operations it can be noticed that the decision to launch 
a mission was always a political one. Therefore to carry out a mission abroad, 
several aspects are important. The mission has to be affordable, the political will has 
to be there and expediency must be evident. It is also very important that the 
probability of success according to the mandate is high. (Ehrhart, 2007: 21ff) 
 
6.3. Important former Missions of the Union 
 
During the last decade the EU was very active in Africa regarding conflict 
management and peacebuilding. While the EU is sponsoring the African Peace 
Facility (APF), supports the African Union (AU) and the UN and therefore seeks to 
prevent sending European soldiers and development personnel to Africa, sometimes 
it is inevitable for the Union to send their own forces. This is due to the fact that 
Africa, even with the AU and the APF, will not have the capabilities to carry out 
operations on a suitable scale in the near future. (Olsen, 2009: 256) 
The three biggest and most important missions of the EU have been carried out 
within the last decade. Two of them, namely 2003´s Operation Artemis and 2006´s 
EUFOR DR Congo both took place in the DR Congo while 2007´s EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA was deployed to Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).  
All 3 missions had several aspects in common. They were time bound missions 
without NATO or AU support, were handed over to the UN after the mandate expired 
and were heavily influenced by major contributions by France.  
As most of the recent EU missions took place in Africa the question is legitimate why 
this was the case.  
It can be seen as a fact that not only the good of Africa was in the focus of the EU but 
also self-interest, especially from countries which were former colonial powers in the 
area. Furthermore, Operation Artemis can be seen as an attempt to show the 
European cooperation in the direct aftermath of the conflicting opinions over the Iraq 
war that the EU is a global player regarding civilian-military missions. The 2006 
mission on the other hand can be understood as a reaction to The Netherlands´ and 
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Ireland´s ‘No’ to the Constitutional Treaty. The Union wanted to show that it still is 
capable of carrying out an important foreign mission despite this defeat. (Olsen, 
2009: 257) The EUFOR mission in Chad and the CAR will be described in detail 
later. 
 
6.3.1. Operation Artemis 
 
This operation was the first military mission by the EU without NATO support. The 
goal of Artemis was to restore order and stop the killing in Bunia in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). It was launched on 12 June 2003 and concluded on 7 
September that year. The operation (Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003) had a 
robust Chapter VII53 mandate and consisted of 1.400 troops, half of them were 
French. The forces should secure Bunia, the Bunia airport and the refugee camps as 
well as the housing of IDPs. The mission was able to reach these, admittedly very 
narrow, goals but could not achieve any sustainable effect which was one of the 
reasons why only 3 years later another mission to the DRC had to be deployed. 
There were some major points of criticism raised regarding Artemis. First of all it was 
basically a French mission as soldiers from this country were the only ones engaged 
in military operations. Also the headquarters were located in France. Additionally the 
mission was too narrow in scale to be called a real success as only a few kilometres 
outside Bunia massacres continued. It was clear from the beginning that the EU saw 
Artemis as a testing ground for its following operations without NATO support. It 
should show the legitimacy of the newly established PSC, EUMC and the CIVCOM in 
handling this kind of operation. (Bagoyoko and Gibert, 2007: 21) The costs of the 
operation were a big motive for the short timeframe and scope. It just could not be 
afforded, especially by France, to stay longer. This was not a positive sign, because 
Operation Artemis was very small compared to missions of the USA or Russia. 
(Deheza, 2009: 4) 
                                                 
53 This mandate allows direct engagement for the EUFOR when civilians are at risk. Chapter VII 
enhanced the deterrence effect of the presence. 
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The framework nation concept proved to be suitable for such an operation however 
which lowered the odds that a common European army would be established in the 
near future. (Faria, 2004: 48) 
 
6.3.2. EUFOR RD Congo 
 
The goal of this mission was to protect civilians and the airport of Kinshasa. 21 EU 
Member States, as well as Turkey and Switzerland, were part of this mission which 
involved 2.300 troops. The mission lasted from 12 June 2006 to 30 November 2006 
and took place in and around Kinshasa. (Deheza, 2009: 5) It was supported by UN 
Security Council Resolution 1671. 
The reason why another mission had to be deployed in Congo was that during the 
political process of the past three years important groups within the country were not 
represented in the government.54 The upcoming election in 2006 was feared to be a 
triggering moment for conflict breaking loose because of this structural failure.  
Like in Artemis one of the big problems for the mission was to obtain enough 
personnel and equipment from the member states. Another problem was that many 
saw the operation as an attempt of Belgium and France to secure their influence in 
the DRC. On the 12 December 2005 the Council of the EU told the Congolese people 
that the EU wants to help them on the way to a democratic system. Three days later 
the Council also accepted the strategy paper ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a 
Strategic Partnership’, which says that stability and security of Africa is a precondition 
for sustainable development and that the EU wants to help the United Nations by 
achieving peace, also with military means. This includes the use of the EU 
Battlegroups. (Burkhardt, 2008: 15) 
EUFOR RD Congo was seen as a success regarding the mandate as during the 
deployment not much violence could be observed within the areas where EUFOR 
was stationed. The election passed without bloodshed and the armed forces only had 
                                                 
54 For more information about the reasons of conflict within the DRC during that time I would like to 
refer you to Justenhoven and Ehrhart, 2008. 
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to intervene once. After EUFOR left violence returned however and the opposition 
leader Bemba, who lost the election to Kabila, had to go into exile. It therefore must 
be said that EUFOR RD Congo did not help to provide a sustainable peace within the 
country but could only prevent violence during its short presence. (Johnson, 2008: 
29) 
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7. The case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
 
As already pointed out in the introduction of this paper I will only elaborate on the 
deployment in Chad during this mission.  
Chad is the fifth largest country in Africa, even though it only has less than 10 million 
citizens. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, currently numbered 163 out of 
169 countries in the Human Development Index.55 Around 200 ethnic groups with 
different languages live in Chad. A strong north-south contrast exists with the 
northern part being mostly Islamic while the south hosts many Animists and Christian 
people. 
Sudan, the CAR and Chad are said to be a conflict-triangle56 as the conflicts in these 
three countries are highly connected to each other. In addition to that, the Darfur 
region is also of great importance to the Sudanese North-South conflict. This conflict 
system is highly complex, also due to the vast area of the countries. Some of the 
biggest conflicts in Africa are also clearly linked with this triangle57, which makes it 
one huge conflict system that is nearly impossible to resolve. 
 
7.1. The History of Chad: 1960 to 2003 
 
The year 1960 marked a big change for the country as from 1920 to 1960 it was part 
of the ‘Afrique équatorial française’, the French colonial empire. In 1960 
independence from France was achieved, which still left a sizeable military presence 
in the country. (Kühne, 2009: 15) Up to this date the history of Chad´s independence 
is paved with rebellions, abuse of power, corruption and instability. 
                                                 
55 See http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Table1_reprint.pdf  
56 See Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti, 2009  
57 Examples are the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the internal conflicts in Somalia, Northern 
Uganda and North Eastern Congo. 
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In 1960 Francois Tombalbaye, a man from the south of the country, became Chad´s 
first president. The independence and the new president got the citizens of Chad 
hoping that a change for the good of the people was going to happen. This hope was 
crushed in 1966 at the latest when civil war broke loose in the Muslim dominated 
north due to ethnic clashes which were linked to the autocratic rule of Tombalbaye. In 
1975 the president was killed in a successful coup, which was led by a rebel group 
called Front de libération nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT). Goukouni Oueddei, who 
was supported by Libya, was appointed as president but only achieved a short rule 
as his former companion in arms, Hissène Habré, who split from FROLINAT to set up 
his own Forces armées du nord (FAN), overthrew him in 1982 by invading the capital 
N’Djamena. Habré´s rule was always fragile since Libya, under Gaddafi, who 
controlled parts of northern Chad, stood against him, while he enjoyed support from 
Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France and the United States which were opposed to 
the idea of Libyan expansion. 
Libya remained an important factor in Chadian domestic policy as it supported Idriss 
Déby, former security advisor of Habré´s government, when he was no longer in 
favour of the President. Déby retreated to Darfur from which he established a rebel 
army capable of overthrowing Habré. The coup, which took place in 1990, was 
successful and Habré was forced to exile. Idriss Déby, who is also the current 
president, won the next two elections in 1996 and 2001 but did not change the 
political structure in the conflict torn country. Still, the 1990s can be called a time of 
relative stability for Chad since no big conflicts occurred. In 2003 huge amounts of oil 
were found in Chad´s territory which opened up a new source of income for the Déby 
regime. (Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti, 2009: 4) 
 
7.2. The History of Chad: 2003 to 2008 
 
2003 was the year when the area of Darfur in Sudan got big media attention because 
of the massive flows of refugees and IDPs which affected the stability of both Sudan 
and Chad. During the same time a proxy conflict was going on between these two 
countries as both sides supported rebel groups, which were trying to overthrow the 
governments in N’Djamena and Khartoum respectively. Sudanese backed militia and 
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rebels were operating from Darfur to overthrow Déby while the Chadian aided rebels 
had their safe haven in eastern Chad. This time was marked by ever changing 
coalitions between rebel groups and militias but also between Chad and Sudan, 
which were officially allies in one moment and enemies in the next. Especially Déby 
often assured the Sudanese government that he would fight the biggest rebel group 
which was trying to overthrow the current president Omar al-Bashir, even though the 
military backbone of this group consisted mostly of the Zaghawa, the tribe Déby 
belongs to. In 2005 Déby decided to support the Chadian rebels in their fight as he 
needed their assistance to secure his third term, for which he changed the 
constitution in 2004. The support of the rebels was important as the general public 
opposed this constitution change. Therefore he needed every domestic support he 
could get to secure a further term as president and sacrificed the cooperation with 
Sudan for that matter. Around this time the first earnings from the oil production came 
in which opened new possibilities of patronage for the government. (Giroux, Lanz 
and Sguaitamatti, 2009: 6) This strategy deepened the conflict with Sudan, which 
also started to openly support rebel groups again, shortly interrupted by a peace 
treaty in 2007. It was suspected that Déby signed the treaty to buy himself time 
before the EUFOR mission was deployed.58 (Seibert, 2010: 10ff) The Sudan backed 
rebel groups carried out two big offensives in 2006 and 2008 with substantial support 
from Sudan´s al-Bashir, who again allowed anti-Déby rebels to operate from Darfur. 
Both coup attempts did not achieve to overthrow Déby but the proxy war between 
Sudan and Chad was in full effect again. (Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti, 2009: 6f) 
The 2006 coup attempt took place shortly before the Presidential election. After the 
attack was repulsed59 and Déby got re-elected the EU tried to bring the government 
and the rebels on a table where they should sign a truce. This undertaking was not 
successful however, as the government proclaimed a state of emergency which led 
to harsh oppression against the opposition and the media. (Brüne, 2008: 210) 
                                                 
58 Déby hoped that the French would support him, like they did in the past, even though the mission 
was planned as being impartial. As the other contributing states had to rely much on the French these 
hopes were not seen that absurd. (Seibert, 2010: 10) 
59 It showed the weakness of the government troops though as it took severe efforts for Déby to stay in 
power. (Marchal, 2009: 21) 
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During the year 2006 a general intensification of conflict could be observed in eastern 
Chad, especially in the border areas between Chad and Sudan. This escalation led 
to an increase in numbers of IDPs and refugees which subsequently worsened the 
situation in both countries. Around that time 230.000 Sudanese refugees were 
reported in this area. (Seibert, 2007: 8) 
 
7.3. Oil in Chad: The Resource Curse 
 
In early 2000, shortly after the first oil discoveries, the World Bank agreed to support 
a project in Chad to be able to partly regulate the use of the revenues by 
implementing a model project. A private consortium invested in the Chadian oil 
pipeline project which financed a pipeline from Chad to Cameroon for the oil to be 
exported. (Frank and Guesnet, 2010: 8) 
It was the largest single private sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa ever. The oil 
pipeline from Southern Chad to Cameroon´s Atlantic coast was seen as a test field 
for the World Bank. It gave credits and overlooked the project to prevent ‘resource 
curse’ effects for Chad as they were seen in the past in resource-rich African 
countries. 
The first oil started to flow in 2003 but major problems occurred before and after this 
date. The support of the World Bank was granted under the condition that 
institutional capacity-building must take place to ensure that large parts of the future 
income from the oil were being used for fighting poverty in Chad. In the end the 
project ended abruptly in 2008 after it was obvious that the Chadian government did 
not fulfil their part of the agreement. (Pegg, 2009: 311)  
Incidents in 2004 made it obvious that Déby needed the funds from the sale of oil for 
other areas than poverty alleviation. Despite the fact that oil revenues arrived in the 
London based account at the end of 2003, the Chadian government was not able to 
repatriate it to the country until July 2004. The beginning of 2004 was a critical time 
as money was scarce and the military personnel did not receive their salary for 
several months, which led to an unsuccessful coup attempt by parts of the military.  
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2005 can be marked as the year where the contract on how to use the oil funds was 
violated by Chad. Law001/PR/99 also known as the Revenue Management Law001, 
which should grant the poor a lion´s share of the income, was altered by the Chadian 
parliament. This alteration changed three important factors of the agreement. 
Before the change it was negotiated by the Chadian government and the World Bank 
that there were five priority sectors where most of the money has to go. These were 
health and social services, rural development, education, infrastructure and 
environmental and water resources. The Déby government added justice, security 
and territorial administration to the prioritised areas. The second alteration changed 
another integral part of the contract which said that non-priority sectors should only 
get 13.5 per cent of the oil income. This number was raised to 30 per cent. The third 
change was that the Future Generations Fund, a savings fund which should get 10 
per cent of all revenues, was eliminated. (Pegg, 2009: 312ff) 
The reaction of the World Bank was freezing all new and existing loans and the 
account where all the oil revenues went. Déby replied with the announcement that he 
would expel the estimated 200.000 Sudanese refugees back to Sudan and that he 
would cut off all oil exports. This announcement was a good strategy on Déby´s part 
as he knew that the Western countries would not want a worsening situation 
regarding Darfur and also did not like the idea of a regime change in Chad as this 
would lead to instability. An agreement was subsequently signed between the World 
Bank and Chad in which both parties made concessions. The outcome was that 
Chad had to devote 70 per cent of the oil revenues to poverty reduction and to 
improve transparency and accountability in the use of the money of the 2006 budget. 
The country should also set money aside for a special fund and forward 5 per cent of 
the revenues directly to the oil producing areas. On the other hand the World Bank 
lifted the freeze and Chad had access to the funds again. (Pegg, 2009: 314)  
Some say that the World Bank made too many concessions for just a revised one 
year budget and a few blurry promises. In 2006 Déby strengthened his bargaining 
power again by telling China that it is welcome to invest in the oil sector. This strategy 
aimed at putting pressure on the private western consortium to agree to lower their 
share from 60 per cent to 40 per cent which would make the Chadian state the most 
influential shareholder. 
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In 2007 the Chadian government continued the belligerent approach by making it 
difficult for NGOs to move near the oil producing areas as travel permits were needed 
from now on, which were nearly impossible to get. The same year the promise of 
giving 5 per cent of the oil revenues to the producing areas was abolished. (Pegg, 
2009: 315) 
All these actions finally led to the withdrawal of the World Bank in 2008.60 
It can be concluded that the ‘resource curse’ has repeated itself in Chad as the oil did 
not better the situation for the Chadian people but even worsened it as the Human 
Development Index rankings show from 2003 to 2010.61 On the other hand the rule of 
President Déby was consolidated by the oil funds as a patronage system ensures the 
loyalty of his inner circle and that of many tribes and rebel groups until now. He also 
heavily invested in military equipment and can pay a regular salary to the armed 
forces now. The rich oil fields also caused the rebels opposing Déby to fight even 
harder against the central government as overthrowing the Déby is even more 
lucrative now. (Frank and Guesnet, 2010: 64) 
 
7.4. The Reasons for Conflict in Chad 
 
The current and on-going conflict in Chad is often said to be a spill over from the 
Darfur region but it can be also seen the other way around. The Chad-Sudan-CAR 
triangle points out that this conflict is not that simple but on the contrary very complex 
and thus does not respond to simple resolution patterns. I will not further elaborate 
on reasons linked with the conflict triangle as this would exceed the scope of my 
paper.  
I will only write about internal reasons and actors which are all at least partly the 
reason for the conflict. 
                                                 
60 For the lessons learned by the World Bank I would like to refer to Pegg, 2009: 316-320 
61 See http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TCD.html 
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7.4.1. Idriss Déby and his Government 
 
In 1996 Déby was re-elected without much media attention outside the country. This 
was due to the fact that there was no electoral fraud in large scope to be seen. The 
election in 2001 on the other hand was openly doubted and is seen as illegitimate as 
most opposition parties did not participate. (Kühne, 2009: 14) 
During the 1990s Déby started to initiate a democratisation process which 
unfortunately did not lead the country to democracy. He introduced a multi-party 
system and did not oppose pluralist media but he also legalised state violence by 
bringing special laws on the way.  
After the second election in 2001 he still reacted to the criticism and said that he 
would not run for a third term but he broke that promise by changing the constitution 
in 2004 and got re-elected in 2006. Many experts see this triggering event as one of 
the most important factors for the violence during the last couple of years. (Handy, 
2008: 4) From that time on Déby probably could only stay in power as the rebel 
groups did not form a united force but also fought among each other which made it 
easier for Déby to control them. (Mattelaer, 2008: 7) 
Déby belongs to the tribe of the Zaghawa which are overly represented in the political 
power structure and hold many important positions. These loyal people secure his 
power but hold conflict potential within them. (Seibert, 2010: 7) 
During his rule different political positions were and are mostly expressed through 
violence, a fact which put Chad into constant civil war. This never ending violence 
gave birth to a war economy which makes conflict profitable for a few. These actors 
do not have interest in a peace process and constantly try to enlarge and defend 
their area of power. (Handy, 2008: 3) 
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7.4.2. Ethnic Causes 
 
The history of Chad has always been marked by clashes between its many tribes and 
ethnic groups, especially in areas where the governmental control is low, if present at 
all. These constant struggles for power, land, water, and resources fuel all the other 
conflicts in the Chad-Sudan-CAR region. All three countries share borders, drawn by 
the former colonial powers which did not pay attention to ethnic demography. 
Especially Chad has been in Civil war most of the time since its independence. This 
also reflects the fact that no President of Chad got into that position without 
overthrowing the old regime. This fact is also due to the circuitousness of the country 
which is a good prerequisite for rebel groups to establish safe havens. (Mattelaer, 
2008: 6) 
 
7.4.3. Rebels and Militia 
 
Even though most rebel groups do not have interest to be feared among the Chadian 
citizens they are often forced to include the civil population into their conflict. They 
have to ask them for food, water and equipment and if they do not cooperate they 
loot them for these goods. Most of the anti-government rebels have their 
headquarters in the eastern area of Chad. (Mattelaer, 2008: 8)  
One of the main reasons why there are many rebel groups is, that due to the absent 
of democratic institutions, rebellion and violence is seen as the only way to express 
political will, which is catastrophic for a country and its population. (Handy, 2008: 4) 
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7.5. The Way towards a Chad Mission 
 
The idea of a joint mission in Chad was seen as an act of necessity and it was 
certainly not the first choice to stabilise the Chad/Darfur area. 
In May 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy got elected as President of France and Bernard 
Kouchner was appointed as Foreign Minister. Both of them wanted to do something 
to stabilise the Darfur area despite the fact that the UN and the AU were already in 
this area. 
The AU started a peacekeeping mission in Darfur, named African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS)62, but this mission was seen as ineffective and unsuccessful as it was 
not able to address the problems in this area. Even after the UN stepped in to 
establish a hybrid operation with the AU (African Union/United Nations Mission in 
Darfur or UNAMID) the situation did not change for the better. This upgraded 
operation involved more soldiers and better equipment but failed to make a 
difference. In 2007, at the same time the EU started working on a Chad mission, the 
UN wanted to send troops to eastern Chad. This plan was not successful as 
President Déby did not want a far reaching and political UN mission in his country. 
The idea of a French-led EU mission was much more to his liking as he hoped that 
he could influence this operation.  
During EUFOR Tchad/RCA a small UN mission was still allowed in the country as it 
was not political and very small in scale. This mission was named United Nations 
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and trained Chadian 
police officers which were to be employed within the refugee camps. (Mattelaer, 
2008: 8f) 
Prior to the concrete planning of EUFOR Tchad/RCA Kouchner first proposed to 
establish humanitarian corridors, which should provide development aid to the people 
of Darfur. NGOs and experts who were invited by Kouchner strongly objected to this 
idea, as did the UN. This defeat of Kouchner only encouraged him more and he 
                                                 
62 The operation was launched in January 2008 on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1769. 
(Deheza, 2009: 6) 
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proposed that the EU should carry out a mission in Chad and the CAR which should 
be taken over by the UN at a later time. (Marchal, 2009: 23) He sent out a cable to all 
EU foreign ministries which can be seen as the starting point of the preparations to 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA. (Mattelaer, 2008: 10) 
The question why France was so eager to carry out an operation in Chad has several 
answers. Originally a new mission with a capable mandate should take place in 
Darfur but the government in Khartoum did not want European troops within its 
territory. The UN also opposed this proposal as UNAMID was already working there. 
This led to the idea of a mission in the eastern part of Chad and the CAR which 
should show the strength and leadership of the new French government by leading a 
new European mission. (Marchal, 2009: 24)  
The French, as a former colonial power, had been greatly involved in Chad´s internal 
politics, also after the independence of the country. It was always a reliable ally of the 
Chadian government, a fact which could affect the mission positively as well as 
negatively. Especially the military involvement of France since the 1970s is important 
to point out. Since 1986 France has also permanent military staff and equipment in 
Chad under the name Operation Epervier. The original purpose of this deployment 
was to prevent a Libyan invasion but it also stayed beyond this threat and up to this 
day. It helped the government also in cases were Libya was not involved at all. 
(Charbonneau, 2007: 556) 
But not only France saw the potential of a positive image campaign through a 
mission in Chad. Also the whole EU hoped that positive public visibility of the EU and 
its institution could be achieved. The crisis management institutions also wanted to 
prove their legitimacy once again. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 8)  
Still, the bad diplomatic situation between France and Sudan, due to French funding 
of the Chadian military, made an operation in the area not easy. From 2006 on 
France did not get tired of pointing out the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur but did 
not mention its own responsibility by providing military equipment to Chad. These 
weapons did not all stay within the Chadian military apparatus but also spread across 
the region and fuelled this permanent conflict. (Charbonneau, 2007: 556) 
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The first plan for a mission in Chad was very different from the approach which would 
be carried out later on. Prior to the operation substantial concessions to President 
Déby had to be made which led to a much weaker mandate for the mission than 
originally planned. The desired mandate by the UN would have included a massive 
United Nations police presence as well as a UN military force which number should 
have been around 11.000 soldiers and police forces. This force would have had 
fewer problems in operating in this large area. This proposal was neglected however 
by the Chadian government as it did not want a UN military force in its country. 
Instead the negotiators on the Chadian side countered with a different proposal which 
led to a deadlock within the negotiations with the UN. Former French Foreign Minister 
Kouchner travelled to N’Djamena to discuss the situation with Déby and brought 
EUFOR Chad/RCA on its way, as the government agreed to have a French-led 
European mission in Chad. (Kühne, 2009: 19)  
If only the EU had the saying in this new situation the whole operation would have 
been very different to the actual EUFOR mission. The EU wanted to send troops 
along the border between Chad and Sudan but both countries involved opposed this 
plan. Chad also turned down a proposal which would have sent EU military personnel 
in the eastern region in Chad with the mission to stabilise it. After long negotiations 
the EU and Chad agreed on a watered down mandate which should only protect UN 
personnel, IDPs and refugees and enable the exercise of development aid in Chad 
and the CAR. In contrast to the proposals of the EU this agreement did not engage in 
internal politics of both countries of operation as such an intervention was not desired 
by Déby and his government. (Charbonneau, 2007: 557) 
 
7.6. EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Planning and Timeline 
 
After the cable by Kouchner it took two months until a Council Commission Options 
Paper was produced on 13 July 2007, followed by a CMC on 27 July. This CMC was 
granted by the PSC on 10 September 2007 while on the same day Mount Valérien 
was picked as OHQ. The following days the Council granted the CMC as well as the 
MSO. One of the most important papers of the Mission was Resolution 1778 which 
was approved by the UN Security Council and gave the following EU mission a legal 
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fundament for one year. The mission also got a Chapter VII mandate to be able to 
fulfil its mission properly. The JA by the Council was agreed on in October, while on 
14 January 2008 the OPLAN was finished. (Mattelaer, 2008: 14) 
From 9 November 2007 on five Force Generation Conferences had to be held to 
gather enough commitment promises for personnel and equipment from the EU 
member countries to carry out this operation. It was embarrassing for the Union that it 
took that many meetings to gather a relatively small force. Four different MSOs were 
worked out from which MSO 3, which drew most of the attention to the military, got 
picked.63  
EUFOR Tchad/RCA was prepared as a Military Bridging Operation which should be 
taken over by the UN after a year but was sold to European governments and their 
citizens as a humanitarian operation. By the time EUFOR Tchad/RCA was deployed 
there was still no decision on a following mission by the UN, which indicates that the 
EU hoped for an UN mission but could not be sure if such a successor mission was 
really to follow. 
Soon in the planning process it was seen as important that the EU force has to be 
impartial and would not intervene in any fighting, which is not threatening civilians. 
From the beginning it was thus clear that there could be fighting between rebels and 
government troops. However, even if EUFOR soldiers were stationed in these 
fighting areas they would not intervene, except if they had to defend civilians or 
themselves. Nevertheless the mission should lead to a Secure and Safe Environment 
(SASE) for the people in Chad. 
From the outset the mission was planned to have an end-date instead of an end-
state. A definite outcome was not the goal instead it was decided to achieve a SASE 
condition for 12 months which could be handed over to the UN. According to the UN 
a self-sustaining SASE needs at least 10 years to be established but the EU´s hope 
was that the UN would finish this job to achieve this desired state of a lasting SASE. 
(Mattelaer, 2008: 18ff) 
                                                 
63 See Mattelaer, 2008: 16, for all 4 MSOs, which were worked out. 
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7.7. Tasks and Goals of the Mission 
 
The mission should be performed by the European Union and would be in place for 
12 months. (Kühne, 2009: 19) It was agreed that there would be no intervention in 
the bordering area to Sudan and that the EUFOR soldiers were not allowed to go into 
the refugee camps. Also the Chadian police would still be under the authority of the 
government. (Kühne, 2009: 20) 
The resolution of the UN gave the mission the following tasks 
‘(i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced 
persons; 
(ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of 
humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations; 
(iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and 
equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and 
United Nations and associated personnel;’ (United Nations Security Council, 2007) 
Apart from these official tasks the Union tried to achieve the goal of being seen as 
credible and impartial. To be seen as credible was no problem as EUFOR, despite its 
small force, had the most advanced technology and superior firepower compared to 
the Chadian government forces and the rebels. Maintaining this credibility was very 
important and linked to the notion of impartiality.  
The EUFOR should be impartial but not neutral as civilians who got attacked had to 
be defended against any actor who carries out such attacks. A neutral EUFOR would 
not have been able to react at all in such a case. (Mattelaer, 2008: 17f) This credible 
and impartial force had the main goal to protect refugees, IDPs and also UN 
personnel through military-humanitarian means and to enable the possibility of 
providing development aid in a SASE. The Union wanted to keep the military means 
in the background as these should only be present for deterrence and not searching 
for open conflict. The deterrence aspect was planned to lead to a changed cost-
benefit calculation of the opposing parties, which would make it ‘more expensive’ to 
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target civilians. The attacking actor had to know that it will receive punishment as the 
UN gave the mission a Chapter VII mandate. (Mattelaer, 2008: 26) 
 
7.8. Contributions to the Mission  
 
To get governments to contribute in EUFOR Tchad/RCA was difficult to achieve as 
five Force Generation Conferences were needed until the mission had enough 
resources to be launched. These tough negotiations were also the main reason why 
EUFOR only launched ten months after the first talks, which were held in May 2007. 
From the beginning it was clear that France, as the initiator, had to provide a big part 
of personnel and equipment to the mission but it seems that the participating 
countries thought that France would provide even more than they did in the end. The 
other two militarily important European countries, Germany and the United Kingdom, 
would provide no troops as they were still engaged in Afghanistan. For France it was 
important however that also many other European countries contribute as it wanted 
to prevent the accusation of the mission being neo-colonialism in the first place. At 
the last force generation meeting 14 EU member states provided troops and 22 sent 
personnel to the OHQ in Valérien. The biggest contributions came from France, 
Ireland and Poland, with France providing the capabilities for air support and 
reconnaissance. A helicopter pool was also created with equipment from the biggest 
contributors. As these three countries could not provide enough suitable helicopters 
for the mission Russia helped out and provided the desperately needed missing 
ones. (Mattelaer, 2008: 24)  
In the end 26 countries, 23 of them members of the European Union contributed 
3.500 soldiers. More than half of them were from France64 with 13 countries 
contributing less than 10 soldiers and only 4 more than 100 people.  (Seibert, 2010: 
44) It must also be pointed out that only one quarter of the stationed soldiers stayed 
the whole year, most of them from France, which again strengthened its position. 
(Marchal, 2009: 26)  
                                                 
64 It must be pointed out that most of the troops, which were contributed by France came from that 
pool of soldiers who were already in the country and part of Epervier. 
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The operation was often seen as a French one with some alibi contributions from 
other states. The European countries had the chance to contribute more to the 
mission but decided not to. In this respect France was not really to blame for the 
disproportional French contribution to EUFOR Tchad/RCA, especially since the 
United Kingdom and Germany did not provide anything to the mission besides some 
staff for the OHQ. Especially the fear that France would not act impartial but support 
the Déby regime, which was not compatible with the European standards on good 
governance and human rights, led to the weak contributions of the other European 
states. (Marchal, 2009: 25) France not only had the burden to contribute so much 
personnel and equipment but also had to pay expenses of some other countries, like 
Poland, Albania, the Ukraine and Russia.65 (Marchal, 2009: 27)  
As the European Union has no autonomous military capabilities it relies on its 
member states to provide troops and equipment. Compared to other current and past 
missions of different actors EUFOR Tchad/RCA is of relatively small scale. Still the 
Union had major difficulties to gather enough resources to launch the mission. Most 
member states were reluctant to participate in EUFOR Tchad/RC which threatened to 
undermine the credibility of the mission even before it started. Not all of the shortfalls 
in contributions could be assigned in lacking political will of the member countries 
however, as most countries simply did not have the capabilities in some areas like 
strategic airlift and medical personnel and equipment. (Seibert, 2010: 45) 
It was unfortunate that the newly established EU Battlegroups (EUBGs) were not put 
to use in this operation, especially since they were originally created to carry out such 
bridging missions in Africa. One important reason could be that operations of the 
EUBGs fall under the common costs, so all EU member countries, also Germany and 
the UK, would had to pay for it. This situation is one of the most important reasons 
why EUBGs were never used until now and the Union should reconsider this 
arrangement. (Seibert, 2010: 46f)   
 
                                                 
65 France had to pay for some Polish equipment, transportation for Albanian staff and fuel for the 
Ukraine. Furthermore the French forces had to build suitable accommodation for the Russians. 
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7.9. Logistical Challenges 
 
Getting contributions from other EU member states was hard enough but logistical 
challenges to deploy these troops and equipment were yet to be faced. The vast 
operational area, which is 2.000 km away from the nearest seaport, made the 
delivery long and costly for the EUFOR. For special goods airlift was used but it was 
too expensive to transport goods and personnel in a large scale via this means of 
transportation. The delivery of equipment via sea and road did take up to 45 days but 
as it was impossible to rely on local resources nearly everything had to be delivered 
from Europe that way. (Mattelaer, 2008: 21) Even the most basic goods, like drinking 
water, posed to be a logistic problem. In the beginning much of the water supply 
came by plane. Later on also rain water and wells of the native people were used 
which has not been received well among the Chadians and led to resentments 
against the mission and the people involved in EUFOR Tchad/RCA. (Kühne, 2009: 
26) 
 
7.10. The Deployment 
 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA is the biggest mission of the European Union up to date with 
3.500 soldiers and staff deployed on the ground. From the beginning the mission was 
on the edge of failing since the policy makers of the two countries Chad and the CAR 
were reluctant to let armed forces in.  
A major setback already happened for the mission shortly before deployment should 
begin. From 1 to 4 February 2008 rebel groups tried to overthrow the government in 
N’Djamena. They did not succeed in the end but this incident further delayed the 
EUFOR mission. On 12 February 2008 the first deployment started with initial 
operating capability reached on 15 March but it took until 17 September to reach full 
capability. (Mattelaer, 2008: 14) 
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It was suspected that the attack and the timing of the rebels were pointed at the 
incoming EUFOR mission as most of the rebels did not see the mission as impartial 
but that it would benefit, President Déby and his inner circle.66  
The rebels nearly overthrew the Déby regime as the fighting even reached the 
presidential palace with the rebels controlling large areas of the capital. This area 
could never been conquered though, partly because of the help of the French Air 
Force which intervened informally. (Kühne, 2009: 19) The offensive only took a few 
days and started from the Sudanese border which was 800 km away from 
N’Djamena. The rebel army consisted of about 2.000 people which pointed out how 
weak the Chadian forces were. 700 people fell victim to this rebel offensive, 300 of 
them were civilians. (Brüne, 2008: 208f) 
This attack proved to be a difficult situation for Sarkozy as Déby requested, just like 
in past times, assistance by France, which put Sarkozy in a dilemma. The EU put 
pressure on France that the mission has to be impartial and that France should not 
intervene on behalf of Déby as the tarnished image could not be repaired. In the end 
France provided Déby only with indirect support.67 (Mattelaer, 2008: 10) 
Due to this incident Initial Operating Capability was not reached until 15 March 2008 
which meant that the mandate would be terminated on 15 March 2009 where the UN 
with MINURCAT should take over. (Kühne, 2009: 21) Even though the initial 
operation started in March 2008 it took nearly half a year until the full capacity of 
about 3.500 soldiers was reached in September 2008. EUFOR´s headquarters in 
Chad were located in Abéché with three small bases for Special Forces in Goz Beida 
in the south of the country, Forchana in the centre and Iriba in the north. A fourth 
smaller camp was located in Birao and was used by a French contingent. 
Not only the logistics and the environment of Chad posed to be problematic, also the 
limitations of the missions´ mandate led to problems. It was not only difficult for the 
locals to understand what the EUFOR staff could and should do but also for the 
                                                 
66 Due to the tight ties between France and Chad the biggest rebel group UFFD among others saw the 
EUFOR mission as an act of war. (Brüne, 2008: 211) 
67 The Chadian government got intelligence and logistical support but no French soldier fought on the 
side of the Chadian government. 
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involved Europeans as well. Therefore an information campaign was started shortly 
after the Preliminary Operation Capability. This situation of unawareness of what 
could be done led to a strong gesture which happened during the visit of former HR 
Javier Solana. Many people engaged in development cooperation in Chad, set a 
symbolic gesture by wearing black armbands to demand that EUFOR should do 
more for the refugees and IDPs in Chad. 
The public in Chad and Europe questioned the impartiality of the mission, especially 
since the Déby government achieved a considerable weakening of the mandate 
under which EUFOR operated. The rebel groups in Chad communicated that they did 
not believe in the impartiality of the European force and threatened that they would 
also attack EUFOR troops. In the end however, no fighting between the EUFOR and 
the rebel groups occurred. This was criticised by President Déby who said that the 
EUFOR would support and strengthen the rebels by letting them operate. This 
criticism somehow aided the EUFOR from the accusations of going in to help Déby 
staying in power. (Kühne, 2009: 25ff) 
During the mission violence in the areas where EUFOR operated decreased, even 
though crime, cross border rebel activities and ethnic conflict could not be sustainably 
tackled. The narrow mandate played a major role in this case as it did not give the 
forces the instruments needed. A more suitable mandate could have at least 
supported and financed internal structures and institutions to fight these problems. 
The narrow mandate also limited the impact of the humanitarian aid provided, 
therefore sustainability could not be guaranteed. It could be also noticed that during 
the last years and also during the deployment of EUFOR the country became a 
dangerous place for development workers. One reason is that they were not seen as 
impartial anymore, partly because they were more and more accompanied by armed 
forces. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 10) Not all NGOs and development workers 
cooperated with the armed forces but in reality most of the time no distinction was 
being made by the civilian population and the rebel forces. During the whole year the 
government of Chad could and did not want to help the NGOs and development 
workers. EUFOR also did not have enough resources to guard all bases and people 
who were involved in development cooperation. Many of them would not even want 
this kind of protection for reasons stated above. On the other hand some NGOs could 
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go to dangerous areas with the help of armed forces where they were not able to 
work before. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 11) 
 
7.11. Handing over to the UN 
 
The planned handing over from EUFOR to MINURCAT in March 2009 did not pass 
without a few problems on the way.  
The structures and procedures of the EU and the UN are different, which led to many 
people on both sides just working to make the mechanisms of the major institutions 
compatible to each other. The two most obvious difficulties regarded the 
infrastructure issue and the scarcity in MINURCAT personnel.  
Much of the important infrastructure, which was built or rebuilt by the EU, such as 
airports, was handed over to the Chadian government after the mandate ended 
without an agreement that the following UN mission could use this infrastructure for 
free or at cheap conditions. The result was that the UN had to rent it which was quite 
costly and not to the advantage of the EU and the UN.  
A much more threatening issue was that the EU had to ‘rehat’ personnel to work 
under the UN. This showed the scarcity in suitable staff of the UN. If the EU would 
not have helped out the chances would have been high that MINURCAT could not 
take over the mission. This would have been even more relevant as MINURCAT 
originally had no end date but wanted to stay as long as it was necessary. 
When carrying out bridging missions which will be taken over by other actors it is 
important to prepare them in a way that the process of handing over runs smoothly. 
The crisis management tools of the EU are still very young compared to the UN and 
the NATO, so over time enough experience and knowledge will be gained. (Hainzl 
and Feichtinger, 2009: 15f) 
Nearly a year after the UN took over the government of Chad wrote a verbal note to 
the UN Secretary General demanding not to renew the mandate of the mission. The 
reasons given by the Chadian government were the weak success, the slow 
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deployment of troops and the changing context of the conflict. The latter was argued 
with improving relations with Sudan as well as the current military superiority of the 
Chadian government over the rebels. (Losson, 2010: 1) 
 
7.12. Security-Development Nexus during EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
 
From the beginning a strong scepticism existed between most humanitarian actors 
and the EUFOR. In the end it had to be admitted however that the civil-military 
cooperation was the most comprehensive one up to date and therefore set a new 
standard. If this standard was sufficient is another question. (Helly, 2010: 9) 
The second goal of the mandate was to 
‘[...] facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian 
personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations.’ (Kollies and Reck, 
2009: 155)  
The overall situation of the safety of humanitarian aid personnel got worse during the 
last decades. While 60 years ago the symbols of organisations like the United 
Nations and the Red Cross had a very strong protective effect it constantly 
decreased over the years. Most NGOs share the same fate, as employees of them 
often become targets of deliberate attacks which range from robberies and 
kidnapping to murder. (Kollies and Reck, 2009: 156) This development not only 
impacts the organisations and their employees but also the people who are 
dependent on the services of these organisations. More and more NGOs withdraw 
from dangerous areas nowadays where subsequently important services like water 
and food provision or medical care cannot be delivered. 
Eastern Chad was the main operational field of the EUFOR mission where most of 
the IDPs and refugees were located. This area was also the focus of the 
development community. Many violent incidents towards development and 
humanitarian workers took place within the last years and even during the mission. 
(Kollies and Reck, 2009: 157ff) In 2008 alone more than 160 acts of violence against 
humanitarian workers were documented with even four murders included. With the 
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undocumented number surely being much higher it shows that the respect for logos 
on shirts and cars is fading as many actors do not see NGOs as impartial anymore. 
(Kollies and Reck, 2009: 160) In the UN Resolution 1778 the threats towards 
development personnel were pointed out. They were seen in crime and banditry due 
to a lack of rule of law, in cross border movements of armed forces and in ethnic 
clashes. 
It had a big influence for the development community that EUFOR was a military and 
not a police force because ordinary crimes could not been handled by the European 
forces with responsibility lying with the local police. The result was that most of these 
crimes were never solved as the capabilities and the will of the Chadian police was 
lacking in that area. (Kollies and Reck, 2009: 160f) EUFOR still tried to help through 
increased patrolling in areas where many development workers lived and worked to 
prevent violence against these people.  
As both, the EUFOR and the development organisations in the field focused on 
helping IDPs and refugees, the most visible points of contact were in this area.  
In the beginning EUFOR saw the number of returning people as an important 
indicator if this mission was a success or a failure. 
NGOs strongly objected to this goal because it tended to push people back to their 
home against their explicit will as the EU needed numbers to present. The 
determination of numbers itself was seen as the next big problem. Even if people 
said that they would return to their homes it was nearly impossible to track them and 
check their statements. There were also a lot of people who did not want to return 
home as the IDP and refugee sites provided a better standard of living for them. 
Some people would also go back temporarily during harvesting season and then 
return to the IDP site.  
Another question was if it was always positive if all IDPs or refugees would return 
home. They would often find a fragile situation with non-existent rule of law and 
missing governance which could make the return a dangerous venture. 
All these factors pointed to the fact that the number of IDPs and refugees returning 
was not a good indicator of success at all. Not only NGOs and humanitarian 
institutions but later on also the EUFOR Force Headquarters themselves, through 
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persuasive discussions with the development community, learned to see it this way 
which led to a coalition of these actors against the EU decision makers which wanted 
numbers to present.  
There were also other areas where EUFOR and NGOs worked together. One of the 
most important areas was the movement of humanitarian convoys. Upon request the 
armed forces would open a corridor and stay in the surroundings of the humanitarian 
workers. On the other hand some NGOs used this mechanism to announce their 
movements and destinations so that the military would not be around to secure their 
impartiality and independence.68 NGOs were also able to join military convoys as 
schedules were given out to them. They could also request private escorts at any 
time and an emergency line was set up where humanitarian employees and 
organisations could reach EUFOR 24 hours a day. (Kollies and Reck, 2009: 162ff) 
These services showed that the military sector has possibilities regarding logistics 
and transportation which far outreach these of NGOs and other humanitarian actors. 
These capabilities also benefitted the development community as the EUFOR helped 
with transportation and escorts. (Cottey and Bikin-Kita, 2006: 22) 
To ease and improve the communication between the military and the civilian side in 
Chad a Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Officer was deployed as well as a 
Policy Advisor on Civil-Military relationships. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
meetings were headed by the EUFOR Force Commander once a month where 
experiences and ideas could be exchanged. Most of the time, these meetings took 
place with humanitarian representatives who contributed to the issues raised. CIMIC 
security bulletins could also be accessed by humanitarian organisations and they 
were able to work out security plans together with EUFOR. 
The mission demonstrated that information exchange between the military and the 
civilian side can be very useful, especially for the security policy, as most 
humanitarian actors had been in Chad for a long time and therefore could provide 
EUFOR with important information. The CIMIC mechanism proved to be useful for 
this kind of cooperation in Chad and should be expanded. 
                                                 
9 For case examples see Kollies and Reck, 2009: 165f 
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As also EUFOR themselves carried out some projects which had points of contact 
with development policy it was important that EUFOR and the development 
community decided that the project of one should be coordinated with the other 
policy to enhance coherence.69 (Kollies and Reck, 2009: 166ff) 
 
7.13. Was the mission a success? 
 
If one looks only at the mandate the mission could be seen as a success as IDPs and 
refugees were safe within their camps because EUFOR patrolled heavily around 
these areas. Also the ability to provide development aid improved in these zones. 
However this success has to be seen in relation to the very narrow and non-political 
mandate and the duration of the mission. These factors make a positive long term 
impact very unlikely. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 17) 
No rebel offensive occurred during EUFOR´s deployment but in May 2009, shortly 
after the EU left and the UN adopted it, a coalition of Chadian rebels attacked the 
government again. They were repulsed by the government troops but this attack 
showed that the rebels did not fear the UN mission. This is due to the fact, that the 
UN´s capabilities and equipment are inferior to EUFOR´s and that the French 
EUFOR troops left Chad with the expiration of the EUFOR mission. The attack took 
the country back to open conflict. A sustainable SASE was thus not reached with 
some reports even saying that the situation worsened. Especially NGOs published 
such reports as violence against them also increased after March 2009. (Lanz, 2009: 
52) 
The root causes of the conflict could not be solved which led to the situation that the 
operation was not able to have a positive impact beyond the deployment of EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 11) 
 
                                                 
69 Most of these projects involved (re)building and infrastructure. 
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7.14. Lessons to be Learned 
 
During the EUFOR presence rebel attacks against the government declined, which 
made pacts with rebel groups relatively useless. (Kühne, 2009: 33) Even if the 
mandate was not political the EUFOR forces still influenced the situation as it made 
the room of manoeuvre smaller for the conflict parties. EUFOR was a witness which 
made it more difficult for the opposing parties to act outside the view of the world. As 
a result, fewer illegal border crossings of the Chadian army and Chadian rebels from 
Darfur happened which contributed to a safer environment in the eastern area of the 
country. (Mattelaer, 2008: 28) 
The EU has to admit that for the civilian population in Chad no substantial 
improvement of the general living conditions can be measured. The Chadians are still 
very much threatened by displacement, robbery and death. But not only the native 
people are still at risk, also humanitarian personnel is not safe, as kidnapping and 
robberies occurred to them during and after the EUFOR mission. Over the past few 
years this constant danger also led to a decrease in numbers of development 
workers as well as to retreats from dangerous areas. Especially in eastern Chad a 
SASE was not reached as the security and humanitarian situation was and is 
catastrophic and did not improve at all after the EU and UN missions. This constant 
conflict could once again jeopardise the fragile peace between Sudan and Chad. 
(Losson, 2010: 3)  
One of the most important reasons for this lack of success is due to the short 
duration and the narrow mandate of the mission which was heavily influenced by the 
ideas of the Chadian president. It had to be clear from the beginning that a one year 
mission with a non-political mandate would not be enough to solve any root causes 
of conflict in the area. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 9) 
Especially from a development point of view the end-date method of the mission has 
to be criticised. If an actor wants to achieve certain goals within a mission an end-
state approach is surely the better solution, even if it most likely involves more 
resources and a broader time horizon. It has to be pointed out that even within the 
European Union, prior to the mission, the end-date concept was criticised in the 
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lessons-learned process which took place after EUFOR RD Congo in 2006. This 
approach was nevertheless chosen, because a mission with ambitious goals tends to 
take decades until sufficient results reveal themselves and the mission can be called 
a success. (Mattelaer, 2008: 30) This end-date approach is also not a good strategy 
towards the conflict parties as it signals them that they just need to postpone violent 
acts to the time after the EU force leaves. For the EUFOR mission it was therefore 
important that the following UN mission had military and political credibility as well. 
(Mattelaer, 2008: 31) 
Besides the mandate, the capabilities of the contributing countries did not meet the 
requirements of the vast country. The number and suitability of staff and equipment, 
which was agreed on earlier, could never be deployed in the end and even if this 
would have happened it still would have been too little for such a huge country. 
(Kühne, 2009: 33) 
What slowed down the EU ambitions in Chad was the chain of command within the 
EU, which is too complex and long especially as the civilian and military sides have 
separated structures. These make it more difficult to work together in a productive 
way. (Hynek, 2011: 82) 
It has also to be pointed out that the EU is still much more ambitious than capable 
regarding foreign missions. To find a strategy which is accepted by all attending 
countries is difficult and takes time. Another weak point has also been exposed to the 
world regarding EUFOR Tchad/RCA: When important European countries like the 
United Kingdom and Germany do not support a mission it becomes a problem to 
deploy enough troops and equipment. (Hynek, 2011: 86) 
The handover from the EU to the UN challenged both actors. The planning was 
apparently very poor as some major difficulties and misunderstandings occurred, for 
example the need to rent back the infrastructure by the UN, which was (re)built by the 
EU. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 18) This was not the only problem for the United 
Nations. Throughout the whole EUFOR mission cooperation on any level between 
EUFOR and UNAMID in Darfur was not existent. This was a critical failure as one of 
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the main motivations of the EU to go into Chad was to improve the Darfur situation. 70 
(Seibert, 2010: 62) 
By some the mission is seen as reinforcing President Déby´s regime, which 
suppresses political opposition and human rights and therefore undermines the 
political process in the country. This argument is raised as many Chadian rebels felt 
that the incoming EUFOR mission was not neutral or impartial at all. Therefore they 
attacked the capital N’Djamena on 2 February 2008. During this attack France helped 
the government to repulse this attack. They helped not directly by sending soldiers, 
but informally. On 4 February 2008 the UN Security Council also said that UN 
member states should support the Chadian government, in conformity with the 
Charter (UN Security Council, UN doc., SC/9238, 4 Feb. 2008). On 6 February 
France´s Minister of Defence, Hervé Morin, visited Déby and ensured him full 
support. 
The presence and the tasks of the EUFOR aided the regime insofar as EUFOR and 
humanitarian actors took care of the refugees and IDPs. This left Déby with more 
resources for the conflict with Sudan and the rebels. It was also criticised that Déby 
forced conditions on the EUFOR, not vice versa. That means that he was nearly 
immune to political pressure as he could be sure of French assistance. 
(Charbonneau, 2007: 557) 
One of the biggest problems of all for EU missions abroad seems to be the collective 
amnesia regarding the past operations. In all 3 missions mentioned there were the 
same problems with transportation and too few specialized personnel. (Deheza, 
2009: 10) 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 See also Olsen, 2009. 
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7.15. Conclusion of EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
 
There are voices who say that the EUFOR mission in Chad has not contributed to 
sustainable peace at all but even worsened the situation there because of the 
intervention. (Brüne, 2008: 215) Others say that the operation was a success 
regarding the mandate and showed signs of the improving cooperation between 
military and civilian structures. These diverging opinions show that it is very hard to 
seriously rate this mission on an objective basis. The mandate was just too narrow 
and the time frame was too short to get enough data to name this mission a failure or 
a success. 
Today the EU is well prepared to further intensify the cooperation and integration of 
comprehensive civil-military operations. These deliberations will get a further boost 
because of the still on-going financial crisis which leads to the decline in development 
and military expenditure in most EU countries. This fact makes working together even 
more important, as integrating policy areas leads to more efficiency, the tighter the 
connection is. (Hynek, 2011: 82) 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA made it visible that a tight relationship and coordination between 
humanitarian and military organisations should be established from the very 
beginning with documented coordination agreements between the two sides. EU 
guidelines for the civil-military relations are still missing and should be established for 
future missions. For these guidelines it would be advisable to force the decision 
makers to include the lessons learned from past missions. (Helly, 2010: 10) 
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8. Conclusions 
 
This paper showed that the development-security nexus within the EU significantly 
changed over the last 60 years. From the 1950s until the end of the 1980s security 
policy focused on the opposing superpower and development policy tried to achieve 
development through economic growth while being limited to ‘loyal’ and associated 
countries. Then two decades ago both policy fields experienced a paradigm shift. The 
security policy needed new fields of activity as the USSR collapsed, while the 
development policy had to recover from the ‘lost decade’ which showed that the 
perception of successful development only through economic means was wrong. 
The end of the Cold War, the emergence of more and more NGOs and changed 
security threats fundamentally altered development and security policy within the 
institution of the European Union as well as in comprehensive missions abroad. For 
the last two decades it is seen as important that development as well as security 
policy pull in the same direction. Coherence was one of the important catchwords for 
this interweavement. This coherence between the two policy areas holds risks and 
chances and must be tackled carefully to benefit both policy fields and to prevent a 
‘securisation’ of development. 
Human security, peacebuilding and good governance are other important terms for 
the security-development nexus and will accompany it in the future. Reasons are that 
conflicts or wars cannot be won by military means alone but must be accompanied by 
development policy to lead to sustainable solutions. 
It is shown in documents of the European Union and the OECD that this connection 
of the two areas is not an invention but really apparent, even though these 
documents tend to be very blurry and the wording is very general. A more visible 
interweavement can be seen within the EU institutions and mechanisms. A more 
coherent approach is tried via a new HR, the abolished pillar structure, the CIVCOM 
and CPCC for example.  
Within peacebuilding missions of the EU the most visible connections are information 
and capabilities sharing, which do not only hold advantages but can also have 
negative consequences, especially for the development community. Through the 
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ODA mechanism development cooperation also gets broader with programmes 
allowable, such as SSR, which range wide into the security policy. 
It was pointed out that both areas follow very different approaches within missions, 
which can endanger a profitable cooperation. While the security policy tends to short 
missions with military intervention, the development policy favours long term and 
sustainable missions.  
In chapter 6 it was pointed out that the reasons for conflict are manifold and 
connected to both security and development problems and can only be sustainably 
solved with a mixture of both policy areas. It is also important to understand where 
these conflicts come from to be able to tackle them. 
The case study of EUFOR Tchad/RCA dealt with the history, the constant conflict and 
the EUFOR mission itself, which was deployed to Chad and the CAR. While the 
chapter elaborates on motives, timetables and mechanisms of the EU, it also focuses 
on the EUFOR deployment and the cooperation between security and development 
actors during this time. The analysis showed that the EU is still lacking in many areas 
before and during missions. It was difficult to obtain enough suitable contributions, 
the logistical challenge was tough and the EU had to agree to a watered down 
mandate, which was not in the favour of the EU but of Chad. During the mission there 
were many problems regarding maintaining impartiality and the interaction with other 
actors, for example the UN and also NGOs. 
The situation of the people engaged in development policy improved in areas where 
EUFOR was deployed. In contrast, the work in places where no EUFOR soldiers 
were stationed stayed the same or got even more dangerous during that time as 
many rebels associated EUFOR with the development workers and saw them both 
as their enemies. 
The cooperation of development and security policy could be noticed in sharing some 
goals, for example in the IDP issue, where security and development policy teamed 
up against the decision makers at home in Europe. Other productive points of contact 
were information sharing through official discussions and briefings and capabilities 
sharing. While the security policy could overly profit from information sharing, the 
development community used much of EUFOR´s equipment. 
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There are various lessons to be learned from that mission regarding the security-
development nexus. This knowledge should be implemented into the next missions of 
the Union. This is an important demand as lessons-learned did not always flow into 
following missions. This can be seen with the end-date criticism, which was raised by 
the lessons-learned process of EUFOR RD Congo. Even though much criticism was 
raised this approach was again used in EUFOR Tchad/RCA. 
To see the mission as a success or a failure is in the eye of the beholder. According 
to the mandate EUFOR did succeed and fulfilled its narrow mandate but 
sustainability was not achieved as a lasting SASE and a solution of the conflict could 
not be reached. 
Still, the mission has to be seen as the most comprehensive one up to date, which 
set a new standard for security-development cooperation and coherence. During its 
deployment IDPs, refugees and UN personnel were safe while development 
personnel could work in the areas where EUFOR was stationed.  
Regarding the initial research question an interweavement between security and 
development policy within the EU is clearly evident even if this cooperation still has 
much space to improve. During the last two decades this interweavement got tighter 
as the coherence imperative, treaties, documents and institutions within the EU 
promote a better cooperation and coordination. This interweavement is not only 
evident within the institutions of the EU but also in the foreign missions of the 
European Union. The example of EUFOR Tchad/RCA showed that some strong 
points of contact exist even though the security and development policy are very 
different by nature. Still they managed to share opinions on important matters for the 
development community, information and equipment. It can only be hoped that the 
trend continues and the development and security policy come together even more 
despite their different approaches and structures. This would be important to be able 
to handle future conflicts in a comprehensive and sustainable way. 
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9. Appendix 
 
9.1. List of abbreviations 
 
ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
APF  African Peace Facility 
AU  African Union 
AMIS  African Union Mission in Sudan 
CAR  Central African Republic 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIMIC  Civil-Military Co-operation 
CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
CMC  Crisis Management Concept 
CMPD Crisis Management and Planning Directorate 
CPCC  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability 
CSDP  Common Security and Defence Policy 
DAC  Development Assistance Committee 
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo 
EC  European Community 
ECSC  European Coal and Steel Community 
EDC  European Defence Community 
EDF  European Development Fund 
EEAS  External Action Service 
EEC  European Economic Community 
EP  European Parliament 
EPC  European Political Cooperation 
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy 
ESS  European Security Strategy 
EU  European Union 
EUBG  European Union Battle Group 
EUFOR European Union Force 
EUMC European Union Military Committee 
EUMS European Union Military Staff 
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FAC  Foreign Affairs Council 
FAN  Forces armées du nord 
FROLINAT Front de libération nationale du Tchad 
GAC  General Affairs Council 
GAERC General Affairs & External Relations Council 
GNP  Gross National Product 
JA  Joint Action 
HR  High Representative 
IDP  Internally Displaced Persons 
IGC  Intergovernmental Conference 
LDC  Least Developed Countries 
LON  League of Nations 
MIC  Middle Income Countries 
MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
MDG  Millennium Development Goals 
MSO  Military Strategic Options 
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OCT  Oversees Countries and Territories 
ODA  Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OHQ  Operation Headquarters 
OOF  Other Official Flows 
OPLAN Operational Plan 
PCD  Policy Coherence for Development 
PJCC  Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters 
PMG  Politico Military Group 
PSC  Political and Security Committee 
PSO  Peace Support Operation 
QMV  Qualified majority voting 
SASE  Secure and Safe Environment 
SEA  Single European Act 
SitCen Joint Situation Centre 
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SSR  Security Sector Reform 
STABEX Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation 
SYSMIN System of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products 
TEU  Treaty on European Union 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Date Program 
UK  United Kingdom 
UN  United Nations 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
USA  United States of America 
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WTO  World Trade Organisation 
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9.3. Abstract in English 
 
The paper outlines the connection between the security and the development policy 
within the European Union. Both policy fields have changed substantially over the 
last six decades while always keeping points of contact with each other. Especially 
the last 20 years are of particular interest as a sharp paradigm change could be 
noticed at the beginning of the 1990s. During this time the CFSP was introduced and 
the development policy repositioned itself. Many important documents were released 
within the last ten years, which point out that a development-security nexus exists 
and is expanding. Events, like the war in former Yugoslavia, strengthened the idea of 
a security policy, which is not dependent on NATO or UN assets and led to important 
missions of the EU without help from these actors. This led to comprehensive 
missions with EUFOR Tchad/RCA being the latest and biggest up to now. The 
cooperation between security and development actors is very important in these 
comprehensive missions to achieve sustainable peace. Also within the institutional 
set-up of the EU the development-security nexus is visible, with coherence, human 
security and good government being important catchwords. 
This paper wants to display the security-development nexus within these two areas.  
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9.4. Abstract in German 
 
Diese Arbeit stellt die Verbindung zwischen Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik in 
der Europäischen Union, mit dem Schwerpunkt auf die letzten zwei Jahrzehnte, dar. 
Beide Politikfelder haben sich in den letzten sechs Jahrzehnten laufend verändert, 
sind dabei allerdings immer im Kontakt zueinander gestanden. Vor allem die letzten 
20 Jahre sind für das Thema sehr spannend, da Anfang der 1990er Jahre sowohl die 
Sicherheits- als auch die Entwicklungspolitik entscheidende Änderungen durchliefen. 
Diese Zeit brachte die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, während sich die 
Entwicklungspolitik weg von reinem Wachstumsdenken, hin zu nachhaltigeren 
Methoden, bewegte. Diese Zeit war auch geprägt von wichtigen Dokumenten, die 
betonten, dass die Verbindung zwischen Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik existiert 
und von außerordentlicher Wichtigkeit ist. Der Krieg in Jugoslawien und andere 
wichtige Einschnitte verstärkten die Sicherheitspolitik, sodass die Union seit einem 
Jahrzehnt in der Lage ist Auslandsmissionen ohne NATO und UN Hilfe 
durchzuführen. In diesen Missionen, von denen EUFOR Tchad/RCA bisher die 
größte und wichtigste war, spielt die Kooperation zwischen militärischen und zivilem 
Arm eine tragende Rolle. Eine Zusammenarbeit wird als wichtig gesehen um für 
nachhaltigen Frieden zu sorgen. Nicht nur anhand der Auslandsmissionen kann die 
Verbindung gesehen warden, sondern auch im institutionellen Gefüge der EU. 
Termini wie “Security-Development Nexus”, “Human Security” oder “Good 
Governance” reichen in beide Politikbereiche und können nur in Kooperation gelöst 
werden. 
Diese Arbeit will diese Verbindung zwischen Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik, 
sowohl innerhalb der EU als auch in ihren Auslandsmissionen, beleuchten. 
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